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DON'T DO WHAT I SAY, DO WHAT I MEAN!:
ASSESSING A STATE'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR
THE EXPLOITS OF INDIVIDUALS ACTING IN
CONFORMITY WITH A STATEMENT FROM A
HEAD OF STATE
Dayna L. Kaufman*
INTRODUCTORY QUERY
On September 17th, 2001, President George W. Bush, in response
to a journalist's question as to whether he wanted Osama bin Laden
dead, stated, "I want him-hell, I want-I want justice. And there's
an old poster out West-as I recall-that said, 'Wanted, dead or
alive."' 1 The Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") subsequently
promulgated a Most Wanted list of twenty-two Al Qaeda members,
including bin Laden.2 In conjunction with the list, the FBI offered a
reward of up to $5 million, which included protection of the
informant's identity and possible relocation of his or her family,' for
"information leading to the arrest or conviction" of these individuals.4
The reward for bin Laden subsequently rose to $7 million,' and
ultimately to $25 million.6 The State Department indicated that the
reward was only offered for the "'arrest or conviction' of bin Laden* J.D. Candidate, 2003, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank my
fianc6, Jason Lorentz, for his unending support and friendship. I would also like to
thank Nicole Coward, James Jung, and Amy Wood for fanning the Jessup spark that
led to this Note, and Professor Martin Flaherty for his insightful input. Finally. I owe
a debt of gratitude to my parents and little brother for their love and encouragement
over the years.
1. America's New War: Return to Normalcy (CNN television broadcast, Sept. 17,
2001).
2. Tom Fanner, War on Terrorism; U.S. Shines Spotlight on Most-Wanted
Terrorists,Boston Herald, Oct. 11,2001, at 5; U.S. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Most
Wanted Terrorists, at http://v.fbi.gov/mostwantlterroristslfugitives.htm (last visited
Apr. 7, 2002).
3. Stewart M. Powell, Special Report: Reward for bin Laden $7 Million Bush
Backpedals on 'Dead or Alive,' Ark. Democrat-Gazette, Oct. 10, 2001, at AS
[hereinafter Powell, Special Report].
4. America Responds: Latest Developments, Atlanta J. & Const., Oct. 10, 2001, at
3A; see Farmer, supra note 2.
5. Powell, Special Report, supra note 3.
6. All Things Considered:Continuing Hunt for Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan
(Nat'l Pub. Radio radio broadcast, Dec. 24,2001) [hereinafter All Things Considered].
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and not to so-called bounty hunters who might seek to deliver bin
Laden 'dead or alive.' 7 This caveat, however, did not receive the
same amount of publicity as the original mandate.
The reward for bin Laden's capture is broadcast for 135 minutes a
day in Afghanistan over the Voice of America radio system in
Afghanistan's two main languages, Pashto and Dari.8 The length of
the broadcast was expanded by thirty minutes to include daily crime
alerts that promote the reward offer exclusively.' In addition, the
faces and other identifying characteristics of the wanted men were
placed on posters, matchbooks, fliers, and newspaper ads distributed
around the world" and dropped from United States military planes in
Afghanistan."
In Afghanistan, individuals carry around leaflets displaying bin
Laden's picture with "'Reward, $25 million"' written in large, Pashto
letters.'2 One man admitted to using threats of violence on townsfolk
in his quest for the $25 million reward: "I gathered all the villagers
who live in Tora Bora. I told them that if you keep any Arab... I'll
bomb the village .... ,,'1 This same individual stated that he searched
the Tora Bora region on foot with some other men, looking for any
sign of bin Laden, "as President Bush says, dead or alive."' 4
What if this man followed through with his threat to bomb the
civilian village? What if President Bush's call for help with finding
Osama bin Laden led to gross violations of human rights, such as the
mass murder of innocent villagers as calculated by the quoted Afghani
interviewee? What if the President's statement led to the torture and
murder of bin Laden? Would the United States of America be
responsible for these acts? Disregarding the formidable practical
considerations that make such a suit unlikely, 5 the consideration of
7. Reward for Bin Laden's Arrest, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Oct. 10, 2001, at
A15.
8. Stewart M. Powell, Bush Backs Away From 'Dead or Alive' Comment: U.S.
Offers $7 Million for Information Leading to Arrest, Conviction, Ventura County Star,
Oct. 10, 2001, at A5 [hereinafter Powell, Bush Backs Away].
9. Id.
10. Joseph Curl, Bush Targets 'Most Wanted'; 22 Terrorists Make List; Cash
Reward an Incentive, Wash. Times, Oct. 11, 2001, at Al.
11. All Things Considered,supra note 6.

12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. A claim against the United States for any such human or humanitarian rights
violations is unlikely in the current legal setting. For the United States to be held
liable for such actions, another State or individual would have to bring the claim

against the United States. The political climate in Afghanistan and its relative
dependency on the United States' support suggest that it would not jeopardize that
support by bringing a claim against the United States. See Craig Nelson, War on
Terrorism:RebuildingAfghanistan: Progress Comes Inch by Inch, Atlanta J. & Const.,
Feb. 20, 2002, at 6A (describing Afghanistan's dependence on foreign aid in general);

World Mainheadlines, Middle East News Online, Mar. 29, 2002, LEXIS, Nexis
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these questions is important to better understand the responsibility a
state can bear for the statements of its officials.
This Note seeks to establish a standard for what kinds of statements
from an organ of the State will attach liability to the State for an
individual's actions in conformity with that statement. This Note
draws on the history of state responsibility and decisions in the
International Court of Justice, international criminal tribunals,
regional judicial bodies, and arbitral claims commissions to formulate
a standard. Part I examines the history of holding a State responsible
for the actions of individuals. This history includes both the
development of the law of state responsibility in international law and
the codification of that law by the International Law Commission of
the United Nations. Part II lays out the various standards that have
been used by courts to determine whether a State should be held
responsible for the results of an individual's actions in conformity with
a statement made by an organ of that State. The two standards on
which Part II focuses are the strict standard, which requires a specific
command and effective control, and the flexible standard, which
varies the level of command and control according to the factual
circumstances. Part III compares the standards in these decisions with
the standard iterated in the United Nations Articles on State
Responsibility 16 to determine what kinds of statements should attach
liability to a State in the future. Part IV considers whether the United
States should be held responsible for the actions of individuals
heeding President Bush's command to capture Osama bin Laden,
dead or alive. After applying the standard developed by this Note,
Part III concludes that only the strict standard is valid under the
precedent, the Articles on State Responsibility, and customary
international law. Under this standard, the United States cannot be
Library, MENO file (discussing Afghanistan's military dependence). Additionally,
the United States withdrew itself from the compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice, and, thus, the fora available for such a claim are
limited. World Court Makes Its Mark, Legal Times, Sept. 21, 1998, at 7. One of the
only available fora for a State's claim would be the United Nations Human Rights
Committee; however, no State has ever been sued by another State in that Committee
due to the political consequences of such a suit. A State could try to have the United
Nations arbitrate a claim; however, few, if any, Nations would attempt to hold the
United States accountable in the United Nations given its immense international
political sway. Moreover, an individual would find few fora open to her suit, as the
United States has not signed the Optional Protocol for the Human Rights Committee
granting such a private right of action. See generally Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston,
International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals (2d ed. 2000).
Therefore, the threat of litigation posed in this Note is largely hypothetical.
16. Responsibility of States for internationallywrongfid acts, G.A. Res. 83, U.N.
GAOR, 56th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 162 at 3, U.N. Doc. A!RESt56183 (2001),
available at http'//vvw.un.org/documentstga/res56/a56r083.pdf

Articles].

[hereinafter

U.N.

This Note refers to these Articles in the text as the Articles on State

Responsibility, as opposed to the Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful

acts.
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held responsible for an individual's actions taken in accordance with
President Bush's statement.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY

The doctrine of state responsibility developed over the centuries
from general principles derived from ancient texts.17 The process of
codifying this vast body of law began more than fifty years ago, and
culminated in the General Assembly of the United Nations' adoption
of the International Law Commission's Articles on State
Responsibility in the Fall of 2001.18 First, this section lays out the
general principles of international law underlying the doctrine of state
responsibility. Second, this section explains the development of the
Articles on State Responsibility within the United Nations. Third,
this section narrows the scope of this Note's inquiry into the doctrine
of state responsibility to focus on a state's responsibility for an
individual acting in conformity with a statement from a head of state.
A. InternationalLaw and the Doctrine of State Responsibility
International law is the body of law that governs relationships
between sovereign states.1 9 One of the conceptual foundations
underlying international law is that every state is sovereign and
equal." Each state has equal standing under international law and all
2
international organizations are based on this inherent equality. '
Because states are regarded as equal entities under international law,
there exist rights and duties necessary to protect that equality.2 These
rights and duties comprise the obligations under international law to
which each state is held responsible.'
Although states acknowledge their consent to be bound by some24
rules through signing and ratifying treaties and other agreements,
there are certain rules that states must follow regardless of any
17. Clyde Eagleton, The Responsibility of States in International Law 3-25 (Kraus
Reprint Co. 1970) (1928).
18. U.N. Articles, supra note 16,
3-4, at 2; Draft Articles on State Responsibility,
[1973] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n
4-5, at 174-75, U.N. Doc. A/9010/REV.1
[hereinafter 1973 Yearbook].
19. Black's Law Dictionary 822 (7th ed. 1999).
20. See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 289 (5th ed. 1998)
[hereinafter Brownlie, Principles].
21. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1 ("The [United Nations] is based on the principle of
the sovereign equality of all its Members.").
22. 1973 Yearbook, supra note 18, T 4 n.49, at 174; Eagleton, supra note 17, at 5.
23. Eagleton, supra note 17, at 10. For a more complete explanation of the
historical foundations of the doctrine of state responsibility, see id. at 3-25 and Ian
Brownlie, System of the Law of Nations: State Responsibility (Part 1) 1-9, 35-52
(1983) [hereinafter Brownlie, State Responsibility].
24. See Brownlie, Principles, supra note 20, at 436-37; Eagleton, supra note 17, at
5.
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express consent to do so.y Such rules are contained in the body of
international law known as custom.26 Customary international law is
formed where there is (1) a widespread, uniform state practice that (2)
states follow out of belief that international law demands their
conformity with that practice, a belief known as opinio juris."
Customary international law is binding upon a state because the state
is a part of a community of nations and does not depend on the
express consent of the State:2' "[m]embership in the community of
nations... presupposes the acceptance of the existent rules of that
community; and it is upon this agreement to observe the rules of the
community that international responsibility is founded."-'
The doctrine of state responsibility is a fundamental principle of
international law, the substance of which has developed through the
customary practices of states.'
international law, it is binding
nation's consent.3 The law of
notion that because the State is
can be held responsible for its
person, when a State breaks a
punishment.

Thus, as a form of customary
on every nation, regardless of the
state responsibility is based on the
a person under international law, it
actions as such. 2 Like any other
law, it must receive some form of

The difficult question, however, is when exactly the State has
broken international law. A State can only act through individuals,
whether officials of the State, like its military or police forces, or

unofficial auxiliary forces of the State.33 Therefore, determining when

25. Oppenheim's International Law 29-30 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur
Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) [hereinafter Oppenheimi.
26. See id. at 24-25.
27. See North Sea Cont'l Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. & F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, q
74, at 43 (Feb. 20); see also Brownlie, Principles, supra note 20, at 4-9; Oppenheim.
supra note 25, at 25-31.
28. Oppenheim, supra note 25, at 29-30 ("[E]stablished rules of customary
international law are binding on a new or existing state notwithstanding that it may
dissent from some particular rule...."). However, customary international law is
dependent in some way on the general consent of states. Id. at 24. For example,
before a certain principle is determined to be customary international law, there must
be a clear and continuous practice among the majority of states, showing that there is
some general consent to the practice as a law to which all should be bound. Id. at 2728.
29. Eagleton, supra note 17, at 5.
30. See 1973 Yearbook, supra note 18, 1 53, at 172, 1 4, at 174; Philip C. Jessup, A
Modem Law of Nations: An Introduction 95 (1968) ("The history of [the
responsibility of states]... exemplifies the way in which a body of customary law
develops .... ); see also Brownlie, Principles, supra note 20, at 436: Eagleton, supra
note 17, at 21.
31. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
32. Oppenheim, supra note 25, at 500-01.
33. Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and
Tribunals 183-84 (1953) ("From the fact that States are juridical persons it follows
that they must act through physical persons.... 'States can act only by and through
their agents and representatives."' (quoting Advisory Opinion No. 6, German Settlers
in Poland, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 6, at 22)).
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a State, as opposed to the individual in her own right, has violated
international law is complicated. The law of state responsibility
provides a basis for determining what actions by an individual
constitute the State's violation of international law.34 Although many
authors have written on the subject from a scholarly position,35 this
body of law has been authoritatively codified by the International
Law Commission
of the United Nations in the Articles on State
36
Responsibility.
B. The United Nations' Articles on State Responsibility
The International Law Commission of the United Nations ("ILC")
began consideration of the doctrines encompassing the law of state
responsibility at its first session in 1949. 37 The ILC was formed by the
United Nations General Assembly in conformity with its powers
under Article 13 of the United Nations Charter. During the drafting
conferences for the United Nations Charter, the delegates decided
that the General Assembly should not have legislative power to enact
binding rules of international law.38 The delegations, however, did
desire some work on international law to take place within the United
Nations, and so they included Article 13(1)(a) in the United Nations'
Charter:
The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make
recommendations for the purpose of... encouraging 39the progressive
development of international law and its codification.

In its first session, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 94(I),
which created a committee to consider how the General Assembly
could meet its Article 13 obligations.40 The result of this committee's
discussions was the ILC.41
As stated in Article 13, the dual jobs of development and
codification were originally conceived of as complementary. 2
Because "'codification"' alone seemed too "'rigid,"' the term
"'development'' was included to allow some "'provision for
34. Brownlie, Principles, supra note 20, at 439 ("Thus in principle an act or

omission which produces a result which is on its face a breach of a legal obligation
gives rise to responsibility in international law.").
35. See, e.g., Brownlie, State Responsibility, supra note 23. For a more complete
listing of authors who have written on the subject of state responsibility, see
Oppenheim, supra note 25, at 499-500.
36. See 1973 Yearbook, supra note 18,
37-57, at 169-73.
37. United Nations, The Work of the International Law Commission 89 (4th ed.
1988).

38. Herbert W. Briggs, The International Law Commission 9 (1965).
39. U.N. Charter art. 13, para. 1(a); Briggs, supra note 38, at 11.
40. Briggs, supra note 38, at 12-14; see G.A. Res. 94(I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess.,
55th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1 (1946).
41. Briggs, supra note 38, at 15-17.
42. Id. at 11-12.
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modification"' while maintaining "'a nice balance between stability

and change."' 4 3 The ILC attempted to distinguish between the dual

tasks of codification and development: they conceived of the former
as "'the more precise formulation and systematization of the law in
areas where there has been extensive state practice, precedent and
doctrine,"' and the latter as drafting "'on a subject which has not yet
been regulated by international law or in regard to which the law has
not yet been highly developed or formulated in the practice of
states."'" In the end, however, the ILC was unable to conceive of any
distinction between the two tasks of codification and development,
and declared that "'the distinction established in the Statute between
these two activities [codification and development] can hardly be
maintained."'45
Although the ILC may develop international law as it codifies it,
the ILC does not see this as a radical task involving revolutionary
change; rather, the task is meant to "preserve everything that was
valid in the old rules," while allowing for some change to account for
new situations in international law.' The ILC's role within the United
Nations complements that of the International Court of Justice
("ICJ").47 The ICJ is charged with the development of international
law as it applies to particular cases, while the ILC develops
international law in view of the body of law as a whole." Thus, the
ILC is the legislative branch that complements the judicial branch
found in the ICJ.49 In formulating its legislative policy, the ILC looks
to precedent contained in customary international law, decisions of
the ICJ as well as other judicial tribunals, comments of other bodies of
the United Nations, and input from governments provided at every
stage of the ILC's work.5 The pronouncements of the ILC are not
binding on any state, but they do act as evidence of the development
of customary international law, representing both the widespread
practice of states and opinio juris.51
43. Id. at 12 (quoting the drafting subcommittee for the Charter of the United
Nations).
44. Id. at 137 (quoting the committee's report on the drafting of the Statute of the
ILC).
45. Id. at 140 (quoting the 1956 Report of the ILC); see also B.G. Ramcharan, The
International Law Commission: Its Approach to the Codification and Progressive

Development of International Law 21 (1977) ("The Commission has not, on the
whole, distinguished between rules of international customary law which it codifies

and rules which it puts forward by way of progressive development."); United
Nations, supra note 37, at 15.

46. Ramcharan, supra note 45, at 165 (quoting Roberto Ago, member of the ILC
and the ICJ, and former Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility).
47. Id. at 15.
48. Id.

49. Id.
50. Id. at 16; United Nations, supra note 37, at 21-24.
51. Ramcharan, supra note 45, at 19,24.
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During its first session in 1949, the ILC selected the subject of state
responsibility as a suitable topic for consideration, a choice that was
supported by the General Assembly. The topic went through many
different formulations during its development, first focusing on a
state's responsibility for injuries to aliens, and then expanding that
focus to what the Articles cover today. 3 The Articles as adopted
cover (1) the responsibility of states, as opposed to other international
organizations, companies, or individual heads of state; (2) a state's
responsibility for its internationally wrongful acts, as opposed to its
responsibility arising from lawful acts, such as space exploration or
nuclear testing;-' and (3) general rules governing when a state could
be responsible for an internationally wrongful act, as opposed to
defining rules that impose obligations on states, the violation of which
would constitute a source of responsibility.5 The general rules are
applicable to any situation in which one State's internationally
wrongful act, as defined under any type of document, occasioned
some injury to another State, and "govern all the new legal
relationships which may follow" from that situation. 6
The Draft Articles on State Responsibility were provisionally
adopted upon their first reading in 1980. 57 An incredibly detailed
Commentary written primarily by Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur
for the topic, accompanied the Draft Articles, which is "probably of
greater general significance and value than the draft Articles
themselves."" The ILC gave the Draft Articles a second reading from
1998 to 2000 to update them in "light of comments by Governments59
and developments in State practice, judicial decisions and literature.
This second reading produced the Articles on State Responsibility as
adopted.'
The Draft Articles were "fairly straightforward, conservative in fact
and, while certainly clarifying the law, d[id] not contain much in the
way of innovation."'" The two Articles relating to the topics discussed
in this Note reveal in their Commentaries that they were crafted in
alignment with the law as it existed.6' Draft Article 8, "Attribution to
52. United Nations, supra note 37, at 89.
53. Id. at 89-100.

54. Id. at 91.
55. 1973 Yearbook, supra note 18,
39-40, at 169.
56. Id. 42, at 170.
57. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp.
No. 10
34, at 30, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), availableat http://www.un.org/law/ilcl
reports/2001/2001report.htm [hereinafter U.N. Articles Commentary].
58. Shabtai Rosenne, The International Law Commission's Draft Articles on
State Responsibility 28 (1991).
59. U.N. Articles Commentary, supra note 57, I 39, at 32 (footnote omitted).
60. Id. IT 40-41, at 32.
61. Rosenne, supra note 58, at 28.
62. See, e.g., Draft Articles on State Responsibility, [1974] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n
art. 8 cmt.
4-6, at 284, U.N. Doc. A/9610/REV.1 [hereinafter 1974 Yearbook]; see
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the State of the conduct of persons acting in fact on behalf of the
State," states, in pertinent part:
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall also be considered
as an act of the State under international law if (a) it is established
that such person
or group of persons was in fact acting on behalf of
63
that State.

This section was changed before it was adopted and now provides the
following:
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an
act of a State under international law if the person or group of
persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction
or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct.6
This change may be understood as a clarification of what "on behalf
of [the] State" means in Draft Article 8 because both Commentaries
refer to the same arbitral cases in their analysis of the provision.15
Thus, the standard under Article 8 remains in some measure the same
between the Draft Articles and the Articles as adopted.
One
conceptual development in Article 8 as adopted is that of "control," a
result of the ICJ's decision in Military and ParamilitaryActivities.' As
the ICJ stated in that case the standard for control is based on a
determination of what actions constitute actions on behalf of the
State.67 The addition of this factor to Draft Article 8's "on behalf of
[the] State" standard, however, does not necessarily change the
standard, but rather expands the analysis required under that Article
to include the ICT's interpretation.
The most significant change between the Draft Articles and the
Articles as adopted occurred with respect to Article 11. In its draft
form, Article 11, "Conduct of persons not acting on behalf of the
State," reads as follows:

also 1973 Yearbook, supra note 18, 53, at 172. The Draft Commentary states that
[t]he Commission and the Special Rapporteur... display their preference
for an essentially inductive method, rather than for deduction from
theoretical premises, at least whenever considerations of State practice and
judicial decisions make it possible to follow such a method for determining
the content of the rules relating to State responsibility.
Id.
63. 1974 Yearbook, supra note 62, art. 8, at 283.
64. U.N. Articles, supra note 16, art. 8, at 3.
65. Compare 1974 Yearbook, supra note 62, art. 8 cmt. 1 4-5, at 284, with U.N.
Articles Commentary, supra note 57, art. 8 cmt. n.161, at 104.
66. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.CJ. 14 (June 27); see U.N. Articles Commentary, supra note 57, art. 8 cmt. qq
3-5, at 104-05; see also infra Part II.B.
67. Military and ParamilitaryActivities, 1986 I.C.J. 1 109, at 62 ("[Tlhere is no
clear evidence of the United States having actually exercised such a degree of
control ... as to justify treating the contras as acting on its behalf." (emphasis
omitted)).
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1. The conduct of a person or a group of persons not acting on
behalf of the State shall not be considered as an act of the State
under international law.
2. Paragraph 1 is without prejudice to the attribution to the State of
any other conduct which is related to that of the persons or groups
of persons referred to in that paragraph .... 68
Article 11 was changed to read, in its adopted form:
Conduct which is not attributable to a State under the preceding
Articles shall nevertheless be considered an act of that State under
international law if and to the extent that the
State acknowledges
69
and adopts the conduct in question as its own.
The original restrictive language of Article 11 does not appear
anywhere in the Articles as adopted, although similar text was placed
in the Commentary to Adopted Article 11.70 The standard contained
in Article 11 as adopted, however, is actually one of the alternative
standards for attaching liability to the State mentioned in the
Commentary to Draft Article 11. The Commentary to Draft Article
11 elaborates on the distinction between a State's responsibility as a
result of an individual's act being imputable to it and a State's
responsibility as a result of an act or omission of its own organs. 71 A
State's responsibility under Adopted Article 11 is incurred not
because the individual's action is attributable to it, but because the
State's own organs approve of the individual's actions and adopt them
as the State's own. 72 Therefore, Adopted Article 11 codifies a part of
the original Commentary to Draft Article 11.
The important point, however, is not the relative consistency of the
two sets of Articles, but the fact that, in adopting the Articles, the ILC
shed all language restricting the liability of the State. By removing the
old language of Article 11, which affirmatively stated that there was
certain conduct that was not attributable to the State, the Articles now
focus entirely on standards for holding the State responsible for
certain activity. Whereas once the language strictly forbade imposing
liability for individuals not acting on behalf of the State, the Articles
now explicitly state a circumstance under which such liability could
attach to the State. The Articles on State Responsibility as adopted,
therefore, show that, in writing the Articles, the ILC sought to
68. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, [1975] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n art. 11, at
70, U.N. Doc. A/10010/REV.1 [hereinafter 1975 Yearbook].
69. U.N. Articles, supra note 16, art. 11, at 4.
70. U.N. Articles Commentary, supra note 57, art. 11 cmt. 2, at 119.
71. 1975 Yearbook, supra note 68,
13-36, at 73-82. The Draft Commentary
states that "although the international responsibility of the State is sometimes held to
exist in connexion with acts of private persons its sole basis is the internationally
wrongful conduct of organs of the State in relation to the acts of the private person
concerned." Id. 35, at 82.
72. See U.N. Articles Commentary, supra note 57, art. 11 cmt. T 6, at 121.
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enumerate the circumstances under which states could be held
responsible, expanding possible sources for such liability.
The Articles on State Responsibility, after more than fifty years of
development, codify the circumstances under which a State can be
held responsible for various actions. Between the first and second
drafts of the Articles, the ILC moved to include language that
expands liability for the state. Part III.B explores further this notion
of expansion. The Articles, however, will provide the touchstone for
the analysis in this Note. The next section tightens the focus of the
analysis of Article 8 by first examining Article 8's conceptual subject
matter.
C. The Law of State Responsibilityfor the Actions of Private
Individuals Acting as De Facto Agents of the State
The umbrella of state responsibility covers the many different
situations in which a state will be held responsible for a breach of
international law. It includes a state's responsibility for the actions of
individuals. This responsibility can be categorized as liability for the
actions of individuals who are formal agents of the state and liability
for the actions of those who are not. Finally, the law of state
responsibility delineates a state's liability resulting from a statement
made by an organ of the state and an individual's actions in
conformity -with that statement. This Note focuses on a state's
responsibility for the actions of an individual, who is not a formal
agent of the state, taken in conformity with a statement by that state.
1. A State's Responsibility for the Actions of Individuals
Even though a state can only act through individuals, there is a
difference between holding the State responsible for the individual's
actions and holding the individual responsible for his own actions.
Take, for example, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia.73 In the cases before the Tribunal, officials of the former
Yugoslavian and Serbian states have been prosecuted as individuals
for their actions as officials. Compare this situation with the situation
in Military and Paramilitary Activities.74 In that case, the United
States was held accountable as a state for the actions of its organs.
The individuals who committed the acts were not on trial.
Before liability for the actions of an individual is imposed on a
State, that State's actions with respect to the individual must meet a
strict and burdensome standard. The Commentary to Article 8 of the
73. See, e.g., Initial Indictment, Prosecutor v. Milosevic, No. IT-02-54 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber III May 24, 1999), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/ind-e.htm.
74. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
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Articles on State Responsibility provides that "[a]s a general
principle, the conduct of private persons or entities is not attributable
to the State under international law.

' 75

To attach liability to the State

for the actions of an individual, it must be shown that (1) the
individual was a formal agent or organ of the State, or that (2) the
individual was "in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the
direction or control of, that State in carrying out [his or her] conduct,"

which would make the individual a de facto agent of the State.76

There must be some legal nexus, in the form of a formal agency or an
informal de facto agency relationship, between the individual and the
State for the State to be held responsible for that individual's actions."
For example, a State can be held liable for the actions of its military
officers, who are its agents; however, a State can also be held liable for
the actions of private individuals who are commanded by its military
officers to act on the State's behalf, because the individuals, by that
command, became de facto agents of the State.78

The distinction between these two means of imputing the activity of
individuals to a State, however, must be maintained. The Janes79
arbitration sets forth the clearest delineation of the difference
between these two forms of liability.8" Janes concerned whether the

Mexican government was liable for the damages suffered by the Janes
family as a result of Byron Janes' murder in El Tigre, Mexico, at the
hands of a Mexican citizen, Pedro Carbajal. s1 Byron Janes worked in
Mexico as the Superintendent of the El Tigre Mining Company, and
75. U.N. Articles Commentary, supra note 57, art. 8 cmt. I 1, at 103; see also id.
art. 11 cmt. 2, at 119.
76. U.N. Articles, supra note 16, art. 8, at 3.
77. 1974 Yearbook, supra note 62, art. 8 cmt. 2, at 283; see also U.N. Articles
Commentary, supra note 57, art. 8 cmt. 1, at 104 (stating that "[i]t is necessary to
take into account... the existence of a real link between the person or group
performing the act and the State machinery").
78. See, e.g., Zafiro (Gr. Brit. v. U.S.), 6 R.I.A.A. 160 (Gen. Claims Comm'n
1925); Stephens (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.I.A.A. 265 (Gen. Claims Comm'n 1927). In
Zafiro, the United States Navy registered the Zafiro as a United States ship, yet
maintained its original British and Chinese crew, and utilized the ship as a supply ship
for the Navy under civilian guise. Zafiro, 6 R.I.A.A. at 161. The question before the
Arbitral Commission was whether the United States could be held responsible for the
looting of a port village by the Chinese crew members. Id. The United States was
held responsible for failing to control the crew members of its vessel when it knew the
crew was engaging in the looting. Id. at 164-65. In Stephens, the Claims Commission
held Mexico responsible for the murder of an American citizen who was shot by
"some Mexican guard or auxiliary forces" while driving toward a military check point.
Stephens, 4 R.I.A.A.
1, at 265. Although the Mexican guard lacked a uniform or
insignia, the soldier nevertheless was deemed by the Commission to be "'acting for'
Mexico." Id. T 4, at 267. This attribution was appropriate given the mandate from the
Mexican government validating the actions of local "informal municipal guards"
where the formal protections of the State were lacking. Id. 4, at 267.
79. Janes (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.I.A.A. 82 (Gen. Claims Comm'n 1925).
80. See Cheng, supra note 33, at 209-10.
81. Janes, 4 R.I.A.A. $T 1, 4, at 83.
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Carbajal was a former employee of the mine who had been
discharged. 8z Carbajal killed Janes in the company's office at the
mine, in plain view of many people.' Carbajal casually walked away
from the shooting, leaving El Tigre on foot."' The police delayed in
apprehending Carbajal, waiting more than thirty minutes after the
murder before forming a posse to go after him, and so Carbajal eluded
capture.s Subsequent to Carbajal's escape on the day of the murder,
the police were informed of several locations where Carbajal was
rumored to be residing during the weeks and months following the
murder, yet they failed to investigate any of these locations until the
mining company offered a reward for Carbajal's capture.l By that
time, Carbajal had escaped once again, and still remained at large
eight years later, when the case came before the United States-United
Mexican States General Claims Commission ("USMGCC"). The
USMGCC found that, although Mexico was liable for failing to
apprehend Carbajal, this failure did not result in the same level of
responsibility as that of Carbajal in murdering Janes. '
The
Commission stated the following:
The international delinquency in this case is one of its own specific
type, separate from the private delinquency of the culprit. The
culprit is liable for having killed or murdered an American national;
the Government is liable for not having measured up to its duty of
diligently prosecuting and properly punishing the offender.... The
damage caused by the culprit is the damage caused to Janes'
relatives by Janes' death; the damage caused by the Government's
negligence8 is the damage resulting from the non-punishment of the
murderer.

8

The findings of the commission suggest that there is a fine
distinction between holding a State responsible for its own
wrongdoing and holding it responsible for the wrongdoing of an
individual. A court, therefore, must determine which activities are
attributable to the State and which are not. A State may bear
responsibility, for example, for aiding an operation against the
interests of another State; however, the State might not, at the same
time, be held responsible for the actions of the individuals who
performed those operations.89
82- Id. 3, at 83.
83. Id.
84. See id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id %20, at 87.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 292, No. 9, at 148 (June 27) (finding "that the United States
of America... has encouraged the commission... of acts contrary to general
principles of humanitarian law, but... not flnd[ing] a basis for concluding that any
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2. A State's Responsibility for the Actions of Its Organs Versus Its
Responsibility for the Actions of Other Individuals
A State is presumed liable for all of the actions of its officials and
organs, 9° even actions taken by an official or organ that are technically
beyond its authority, know as ultra vires actions. 91 An organ of the
State is an official branch of the government, whether a legislative,
executive, or judicial body of the government. 9 Article 7 of the
Articles on State Responsibility codifies the doctrine of a State's
liability for the ultra vires actions of its organs. 93 For example, in the
Caire claim, Mexico was held responsible for the actions of a captain
and a major in its armed forces who blackmailed a French individual
and subsequently murdered him when he failed to pay a ransom. 9
The Commission stated that "[t]he State... bears an international
responsibility for all acts committed by its officials or its organs...
regardless of whether the official or organ has acted within the limits
of his competency."9 5

A State is not similarly liable for the actions of individuals who are
not part of its formal infrastructure.96 If the individual acts as a de
facto agent of the State, however, the State can be held responsible

for a private individual's actions.' A de facto agent of the State is
anyone who, by the totality of the circumstances surrounding his or
her actions, is deemed to be acting on behalf of the State. 9 Liability
for de facto agents is never assumed and must be proven by the
totality of the circumstances.9 9 The determination that an individual is

a de facto agent of the State, as discussed in Part I.C.1, requires a high

burden of proof."°

such acts which may have been committed are imputable to the United States of
America as acts of the United States of America").
90. U.N. Articles, supra note 16, art. 4, at 2-3.
91. Id. art. 7, at 3.
92. See id. art. 4, at 2-3.
93. Id. art. 7, at 3; see U.N. Articles Commentary, supra note 57, art. 4 cmt. 1 13,
at 91-92, art. 7 cmt. T 7, at 102; Brownlie, Principles, supra note 20, at 452-55.
94. Jean Baptiste Caire (Fr. v. Mex.), 5 Ann. Dig. 146 (Mixed Claims Comm'n
1929); see Brownlie, Principles, supra note 20, at 453; Cheng, supra note 33, at 204-07.
95. Brownlie, Principles, supra note 20, at 453; see also Caire, 5 Ann. Dig. at 14748.
96. U.N. Articles Commentary, supra note 57, art. 8 cmt. 1, at 103-04.
97. U.N. Articles, supra note 16, art. 8, at 3. There are some circumstances under
which a State, through its acts or omissions after the fact, can become liable for an
individual's acts; however, these situations are not relevant to this Note's inquiry. For
a thorough discussion of these standards for attaching liability, see 1975 Yearbook,
supra note 68, art. 11 cmt. T$ 13-36, at 73-82.
98. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran),
1980 I.C.J. 3, 7 58, at 29 (May 24); Brownlie, State Responsibility, supra note 23, at
160-61.
99. See U.N. Articles, supra note 16, art. 8, at 3, art. 11, at 4.
100. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
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In Diplomatic and Consular Staff, the ICJ found Iran responsible
for its police forces' failure to protect the United States Embassy in
Tehran when it was attacked by a group of student militants.' 0 ' The
court distinguished between Iran's liability for the actions of its police
forces and the actions of the student militants who had invaded the
Embassy."° Although there was evidence that the head of State of
Iran, the Ayatollah Khomeini, had commanded the students to
undertake such an attack, the court found that the militants were not
de facto agents of Iran because the Ayatollah's statement was too
general. 3 The actions of the militants, therefore, were not
attributable to Iran.1" Iran was held responsible, however, for the
failure of its police forces to protect the Embassy, even though there
was no evidence that the government commanded the police to fail to
protect the Embassy.105 Police forces are considered organs of the
State, and thus, Iran was liable for their actions, even if it did not
command them to ignore their duty to protect the Embassy. 6
3. A State's Responsibility for Individuals Acting in Conformity with a
Statement
A State may be held liable for the actions of individuals under a
limited number of circumstances.107 For example, where a State
approves of and adopts the conduct of an individual as its own, it can
be held responsible for that individual's actions."° In Diplomatic and
Consular Staff, Iran was held responsible by the ICJ for the second
phase of the student militants' occupation of the American Embassy
inTehran,"° even though it was released from responsibility for the

101. Diplomaticand ConsularStaff, 1980 I.CJ.

67,at 32.

102. See id. $ 61, at 30. The court stated that the fact that the invasion by the
student militants "cannot be considered as in itself imputable to the Iranian State

does not mean that Iran is... free of any responsibility in regard to those attacks." Id.
103. Id. 1 59, at 29-30; see infra Part II.A.1.
104. Diplomaticand ConsularStaff, 1980 I.CJ. 1 59,at 29-30.

105. Il.161, at 30, 167, at 32.
106. Id. IT 63-64, at 31; see Gordon A. Christenson, Attributing Acts of Omission to

the State, 12 Mich. J. Int'l L. 312, 332-35 (1991) (discussing Iran's liability in
Diplomatic and Consular Staff for its officials' failure to protect the United States
Embassy); see also U.N. Articles, supra note 16, art. 4, at 2-3.
107. See Brownlie, State Responsibility, supra note 23, at 159-63.
108. U.N. Articles, supra note 16, art. 11, at 4. Article 11, "Conduct acknowledged
and adopted by a State as its own," provides the following:
Conduct which is not attributable to a State under the proceeding Articles
shall nevertheless be considered an act of that State under international law
if and to the extent that the State acknowledges and adopts the conduct in

Id.

question as its own.
For further information regarding cases and factors to be considered in

establishing liability under this standard, see U.N. Articles Commentary, supra note
57, art. 11 cmt., at 119-22.
109. Diplomaticand ConsularStaff, 1980 I.CJ. T 74, at 35.
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The ICJ found that the Ayatollah's
militants' initial attack."n
unequivocal approval of the militants' actions, combined with his
commands to the militants regarding their treatment of the Embassy
hostages changed the militants' private actions into those of Iran."' If
a State, therefore, expresses approval of an individual's actions and
adopts those actions in some way, such as the State's perpetuation of
112 the State will be held responsible for the
the individual's actions,13
actions.'
results of those
The scope of this Note is limited to State liability arising from prior
statements. Article 8 of the Articles on State Responsibility sets forth
the standard for attaching liability to a State for the actions of 1an
14
individual taken in conformity with a statement by that State.
Article 8, "Conduct directed or controlled by a State," provides as
follows:
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an
act of a State under international law if the person or group of
persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction
or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct.115
The Commentary to Article 8 explains that the ILC considered this
standard to be a fairly high burden, requiring either express and
specific instructions or effective control of the individual by the State
to attach liability. 116 The Commentary contemplates several scenarios
in which liability could attach to the State under this Article.
First, a State may be liable for the actions of private "auxiliaries"
authorized by official organs of the state to supplement their official
activities.1 7 This type of liability is defined under Article 8 as liability
for "instructions" from the State."' Liability for instructions attaches
when the private individual is told by the State to undertake some
specific mission.119 For example, the actions of individuals engaged in
international abductions of foreign criminals could fall into this
category.1 20 Abduction is a tool utilized by many states' governments
to bring a foreign criminal within a jurisdiction looking to prosecute
110. Id. T 59, at 29-30.
111. Id. T 74, at 35 ("The approval given to [the militants' occupation] by the
Ayatollah Khomeini and other organs of the Iranian State, and the decision to
perpetuate them, translated continuing occupation of the Embassy and detention of
the hostages into acts of that State.").
112. Id.; see also U.N. Articles Commentary, supra note 57, art. 11 cmt. 4, at 120.
113. U.N. Articles, supra note 16, art. 11, at 4.
114. Id. art. 8, at 3.
115. Id.

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

U.N. Articles Commentary, supra note 57, art. 8 cmt. T 2-4, at 104-06.
Id. T 2, at 104.
Id. TT 1-2, at 104.
Id. T 2, at 104.
See generally Paul Michell, English-Speaking Justice: Evolving Responses to

Transnational ForcibleAbduction After Alvarez-Machain, 29 Cornell Int'l L.J. 383

(1996).
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him.o12 1 The individuals in those cases are not normally official
members of the abducting State's government, but are acting in
conformity with the government to abduct the alleged criminal.' m
Second, the Commentary suggests that where individuals are
"directed or controlled [by the State for] the specific operation and
the conduct complained of [is] an integral part of that operation,"
liability should attach to the State. "
Although "direction" and
"control" are never given as explicit a definition as "instruction" is,
the ILC accepts the standard iterated by the ICJ in Military and
Paramilitary Activities as the definition for these terms.2 4 Both
direction and control, therefore, depend on whether or not the
individual would have committed the acts in question without the
direction or enforcement of the State." If the individual would have
committed the acts regardless of the State's direction or control, no
liability will attach to the State.' 26
The ILC notes that the factors to be considered in determining
whether a situation rises to this level are "the relationship between the
instructions given or the direction or control exercised and the specific
conduct complained of."'27 The Commentary specifically states that
"[i]n the text of article 8, the three terms 'instructions', 'direction' and
'control' are disjunctive; it is sufficient to establish any one of
them."'" Thus, if a court establishes that a State instructed, directed,
or controlled the activity of an individual or group of individuals who

121. Id Often, to effectuate the arrest of an individual in a foreign jurisdiction, a
State will utilize private or non-State actors in the actual kidnapping of the criminal.
See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 670 (1992) (holding that the
United States could maintain jurisdiction over Dr. Alvarez-Machain, even though he
was illegally abducted by Mexican agents acting in conformity with directions from
the Drug Enforcement Agency of the United States); Attorney General v. Eichmann.
36 I.L.R. 277, 304-06 (Isr. S. Ct. 1962) (upholding Israel's jurisdiction over Eichmann,
even though Israel directed agents to abduct Eichmann from Argentina on charges
relating to Eichmann's crimes against humanity during the Holocaust); Stockc. v.
Germany, 199 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) IT 54-55, at 19 (1991) (releasing Germany from
liability under the European Convention on Human Rights because no connection
could be established between Stockd's abductor and the German authorities). In
Eichmann, although Israel formally claimed that the individuals who abducted
Eichrnann were not members of the Israeli government, subsequent statements by
members of the Israeli State suggested otherwise. U.N. Articles Commentary, supra
note 57, art. 11 cmt. 5, at 121; see S.C. Res. 138, U.N. SCOR, 16th Sess., 865th mtg.
at 4, U.N. Doc. S/4349 (1960) (holding Israel responsible for Eichmann's abduction);
Michell, supra note 120, at 422-24.
122. See, e.g., Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 657 n.2; see also Michell. supra note

120, at 483-85.
123. U.N. Articles Commentary, supra note 57, art. 8 cmt 913, at 104.
124. See id art. 8 cmt. 4, at 105-06 (citing Military and Paramilitary Activities In
and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14. 1115, at 64-65 (June 27)).
125. See infra text accompanying notes 191-203.
126. U.N. Articles Commentary, supra note 57, art. 8 cmt. T14. at 105-06.
127. Id. 917, at 108.
128. Id
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was not formally associated with the 29
State, the State may be held
responsible for the individual's actions.1
The Articles on State Responsibility codified the customary
international legal principles underlying the doctrine of state
responsibility. The Articles set forth a standard for when a State may
be found liable for the actions of private individuals acting in
accordance with a statement from that State. 130 As Part III explains,
however, it is questionable whether the International Law
Commission remained faithful to the customary law in the process of
codifying it. To analyze whether the Articles on State Responsibility
codify the law as it exists or the law as the ILC thinks it should be, the
precedent underlying the ILC's standard must be examined. Part II
describes the standards used by judicial bodies to determine whether
to impose liability on the State for an individual's commission of an
international wrongful act when the individual acted in response to a
statement from that State. Part III then analyzes and compares the
standards formed by the judicial precedent with those codified by the
ILC in the Articles on State Responsibility.
II. JUDICIAL PRECEDENT HOLDING A STATE RESPONSIBLE FOR
INDIVIDUALS ACTING IN CONFORMITY WITH A STATEMENT FROM
THE STATE

Several judicial bodies have had the opportunity to establish
standards for determining when a State can be held responsible for an
individual's actions in conformity with a statement from that State.
These decisions were utilized by the ILC to formulate the standards
codified in the Articles on State Responsibility. Part III of this Note
analyzes how faithful the ILC remained to these judicial standards
when codifying them in the Articles. This section of the Note,
however, discusses the standards developed by courts and other
judicial bodies for attaching liability to a State for an individual's
actions in conformity with a statement. These courts have examined
two major factors in analyzing state responsibility based on a
statement: (1) the command itself' 3 ' and (2) the level of control
exercised by the State over the individual acting in conformity with
that command. 32 With respect to the command issued by the State,
the decisions focus on the specificity of the statement compared with
the act or acts committed by the individual. With respect to control,
the examination is focused on the circumstances surrounding the
individual and his or her motivation for committing the act. The
courts have considered these factors under two different standards:
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
U.N. Articles, supra note 16, art. 8, at 3.
See infra Parts II.A.1, II.B.1.
See infra Parts II.A.2, II.B.2.

STATE RESPONSIBILITY

2002]

2621

the strict standard and the flexible standard. The strict standard
requires both elements of command and effective control before
liability will attach to the State for an individual's actions. The
flexible standard allows the court to consider the factual
circumstances in each case to determine what level of command or
control should attach liability to the State.
A. The Strict Standardas a Basis for Attaching Liability to the State
The strict standard requires that the State have specifically
commanded and effectively controlled an individual's actions before
liability can be attached to the State. The command must be specific
as to the action to be taken by the individual. Effective control
requires that the totality of the circumstances show that the individual
would not have taken such action without the State's inducement and
facilitation. This standard developed primarily through two decisions
in the ICJ, one dealing with command and one with control.
1. Command Under the Strict Standard
In Diplomatic and Consular Staff, the ICJ had occasion to
establish"3 a standard for liability resulting from statements of a head
of state." On November 4, 1979, several hundred armed student
militants invaded the United States Embassy in Tehran and took over
the Embassy compound, holding the staff and other individuals on the
premises hostage. 135 On November 29, 1979, the United States
brought suit against Iran seeking compensation for the damages
caused by the militants and to force Iran to secure the release of the
hostages. 36 One of the issues concerned whether Iran was responsible
for the actions of the student militants in invading the Embassy.Y
The court determined that Iran could be held responsible for the
militants' actions "only if it were established that, in fact, on the
133. The ICJ does not regard its decisions as precedent, although the decisions are
binding on the parties involved in the dispute. Past decisions of the ICJ are treated by
the court as highly persuasive, but are not dispositive on an issue. See Statute of the

International Court of Justice art. 38, para. l(d), 1947 I.CJ. Acts & Docs 37. Other
courts, tribunals, publicists, and international organizations, however, do regard the
ICJ's decisions as dispositive. See U.N. Articles Commentary, supra note 57, art. 8

cmt.

4-5, at 105-06; Shane Spelliscy, Note, The Proliferation of International

Tribunals:A Chink in the Armor, 40 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 143, 158-59 (2001). But
see Prosecutor v. Tadi6 9 137-45 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, App.
Chamber July 15, 1999) [hereinafter Tadi6 II (majority opinion)], available at
http://wvw.un.orgtictyltadiclappeal/judgement/tad-aj990715e.pdf
(overturning the
ICJ's approach to attribution and state responsibility in Military and Paramilitary
Activities).
134. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980
I.C.J. 3 (May 24).

135. Id. 1 17, at 12.

136. Id. 1 8, at 5-8.
137. Id. 9 56-57, at 29.
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occasion in question the militants acted on behalf of the State, having
been charged by some competent organ of the Iranian State to carry
out a specific operation. 138
The ICJ found that, under this standard, Iran was not responsible
for the actions of the militants. 139 Although a spokesman for the
militants referred to a statement made by the Ayatollah Khomeini,
the religious leader of the country, to explain their invasion of the
Embassy, the court felt that that statement alone could not attach
liability to the Iranian State. 40 The statement referred to was the
Ayatollah's statement on November 1, 1979, that it was "'up to the
dear pupils, students and theological students to expand with all their
might their attacks against the United States and Israel."""' The court
found 42that this declaration was too general to attach liability to the
State.1
The most critical factor for the ICJ's determination was the lack of
specificity in the Ayatollah's statement. 143 The court held that, to
attach liability, the statement needed to provide authorization from
the Ayatollah, as the head of the Iranian State, "to undertake the
specific operation of invading and seizing the United States
Embassy."'" The court found dispositive the fact that the militants
"claimed credit for having devised and carried out the plan to occupy
the Embassy."'" At a minimum, therefore, the statement would need
to have included specific plans for overtaking the Embassy to attach
liability to Iran.
A comparison of the Ayatollah's November 1 statement, which did
not attach liability to the State, and his statement issued on November
17, which did attach liability to the State for the militants' continued
occupation of the Embassy,146 further clarifies the ICJ's standard. The
Ayatollah's November 17 statement was much more specific than his
November 1 statement. The statement on November 17 declared that
the militants should "hand over the blacks and the women, if it [were]
proven that they did not spy," but that the "noble Iranian nation
[would] not give permission for the release of the rest of [the
hostages]."147 This statement specifically laid out what actions the
militants should and should not take. The ICJ found that this was
enough to "fundamentally... transform the legal nature of the
situation... [because t]he militants, authors of the invasion and jailers
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. 58, at 29.
Id.
Id. 59, at 29-30.
Id. (quoting the Ayatollah Khomeini).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. 73-74, at 34-35.
Id. 73, at 34 (quoting the Ayatollah Khomeini).
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of the hostages, had now become agents of the Iranian State for whose
The
acts that State itself was internationally responsible."'"
specificity of the statement, therefore, in asking the militants to take
some specific action-to release some hostages and maintain control
over others-was dispositive in determining Iran's liability for this
second phase of activity. 149 Thus, to attach liability under the standard
established by the ICJ in Diplomaticand ConsularStaff, the command
of a State must include some particular instructions regarding the
operation to be undertaken by the individuals.
The judicial examination of Iran's liability as a result of the
statements of the Ayatollah Khomeini did not end with the decision in
Diplomatic and Consular Staff. The United States-Iran Claims
Commission ("USICC") continued to examine Iran's responsibility
for various actions undertaken by supporters of the Ayatollah's
government during the years of revolution following the ousting of the
Shah."' These cases adopted and upheld the ICJ's standard in
Diplomatic and ConsularStaff.151
The decision in Diplomatic and ConsularStaff established a strict
standard for attaching liability to the State, following precedent set in
arbitral cases such as the Lehigh Valley Railroad cases before the
United States-German Mixed Claims Commission ("USGMCC")."1
These cases concerned various acts of sabotage committed by German
individuals in the United States as a part of a campaign of sabotage
advocated by the German government during World War IY The
acts of sabotage occurred in July, 1916, and January, 1917, and
148. Id. 74, at 35.
149. See id
150. See, e.g., Alfred L.W. Short v. Iran, 16 Iran-U.S. Ci. Trib. Rep. 76, 1 17, at 80,
6-12, at 89-92 (Brower, J., dissenting).
23, at 81 (1987); Id.
31-32,
151. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Iran, 27 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3,
at 14 (1991) (holding Iran responsible for damages where it was shown that the
Iranian government's representatives actively caused the harm and that it gave "direct
authorization" for the actions alleged); Kathryn Faye Hilt v. Iran, 18 Iran-U.S. Cl.
Trib. Rep. 154, 162 (1988) (rejecting the claim that Iran was responsible for Hilt's
expulsion from Iran because there was no evidence that Hilt was "instructed" to leave
Iran by the government or one of its agents); Flexi-Van Leasing, Inc. v. Iran, 12 IranU.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 335, 349 (1986) (releasing Iran from responsibility because the
evidence did not show that the harm was a result of "the instruction of the
Government"); Schering Corp. v. Iran, 5 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 361, 370 (1984)
(releasing Iran from responsibility for the actions of the Workers' Council because
there was no evidence "that there was any governmental influence... [or]
governmental orders, directives or recommendations ... to the Council or that it
acted under instructions of any governmental body").
152. Lehigh Valley R.R. (U.S. v. F.R.G.), 8 R.I.A.A. 225 (Mixed Claims Comm'n
1939) [hereinafter Lehigh Valley R.R. II]; Lehigh Valley R.R. (U.S. v. F.R.G.), 8
R.I.A.A. 104 (Mixed Claims Comm'n 1932) [hereinafter Lehigh Valley R.R.
(Rehearing Grant)]; Lehigh Valley R.R. (U.S. v. F.R.G.), 8 R.I.A.A. 84 (Mixed
Claims Comm'n 1930) [hereinafter Lehigh Valley R.R. I].
153. See L.H. Woolsey, The Arbitration of the Sabotage Clains Against Germany,
33 Am. J. Int'l L. 737, 737 (1939).
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destroyed a harbor terminal and an industrial plant along the New
1 4
York Harbor in New Jersey, causing over $20 million in damage. 1
The United States claimed that the sabotage was aimed at stopping
the flow of supplies to the Allied war effort against Germany.1 55 The
case came before the USGMCC twice. 56 In the first decision, the
court found in favor of Germany because the United States could not
produce sufficient evidence on the issue of agency connecting the
saboteurs to the German government. 157 A key piece of evidence in
the first case was an intercepted transmission from the German
foreign office to the German Military Attach6 in Washington D.C.,
stating that "'[i]n [the] United States sabotage can reach to all kinds of
factories for war deliveries; [however] railroads, dams, bridges must
not be touched there."'158 This statement was not sufficient to attach
responsibility to Germany.159 The United States then uncovered
evidence tying the two fires to Germany," ° including "a secret
message written with lemon juice in code in a magazine by an
admitted German sabotage agent and transmitted by him in April,
1917, from Mexico to a co-saboteur in Baltimore," which included
references to the two sites at issue. 6 1
Additional evidence
conclusively linked the individuals to the German government,
including witnesses who testified that they were sent to America "'on
orders from the German Government."11 62 This new evidence showed
that Germany had concealed relevant facts in the first hearing, and
thus the USGMCC reopened hearings on the cases.1 63 The USGMCC
found "that the affirmative evidence established Germany's
responsibility in both cases.""
These cases support the standard advocated in Diplomatic and
Consular Staff 165 Germany could only be held responsible for the
saboteur's actions when evidence of a specific command was found
relating to the individual's activity) 66 The more general reference to
the sabotage in the first case was insufficient to establish Germany's
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 738-40.
Id. at 738; see Lehigh Valley R.R. 1, 8 R.I.A.A. at 100-01.
Woolsey, supra note 153, at 738 (quoting telegram to German military

attach6).
159. See id.; see also Lehigh Valley R.R. I, 8 R.I.A.A. at 100-01 (relieving Germany

of responsibility for the attacks).
160. Woolsey, supra note 153, at 738.
161. Id. at 738 n.3; see Lehigh Valley R.R. (Rehearing Grant) (U.S. v. F.R.G.), 8
R.I.A.A. 104, 114-15 (Mixed Claims Comm'n 1932).
162. Lehigh Valley R.R. II (U.S. v. F.R.G.), 8 R.I.A.A. 225, 332 (Mixed Claims

Comm'n 1939) (emphasis omitted).
163.
164.
165.
166.

Woolsey, supra note 153, at 738-39.
Id. at 740; see also Lehigh Valley R.R. II, 8 R.I.A.A. at 339-45.
See supra text accompanying notes 143-49.
Lehigh Valley R.R. (RehearingGrant), 8 R.I.A.A. at 106.
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Only once a specific command was located did the

Commission attach liability to the State for the individual's actions.,'

2. Control Under the Strict Standard
The leading case establishing the strict standard for control is

Military and ParamilitaryActivities,6 9 decided by the ICJ in 1986.
Military and Paramilitary Activities concerned the United States'
involvement with a group of guerilla combatants fighting against the
government of Nicaragua."' In July of 1979, the government of
President Somoza in Nicaragua was overthrown and replaced by
members of the revolutionary group that had led the armed
opposition against the Somoza regime, the Sandinistas.7
Some
members of Somoza's National Guard managed to escape from
Nicaragua into Honduras, and from there they launched "sporadic
raids on Nicaraguan border positions."'" Starting approximately in
August, 1981, the United States worked with these rebel forces,
known as the contras, to increase their numbers and to organize them
more effectively.17 3
Nicaragua claimed that the United States was responsible for the
ensuing actions of the contra forces, which included kidnappings,
assassinations, torture, rape, and the killing of prisoners and
civilians.174 This claim relied on the fact that the United States was so

thoroughly involved with the contras that they were essentially "bands
of mercenaries which [had] been recruited, organized,
paid, and
75
commanded by the Government of the United States."'
There was ample evidence of the United States' extensive
involvement in the contras operations.Y16 The Central Intelligence

167. See id at 107-08.
168. See Lehigh Valley R.R. 11, 8 R.I.A.A. at 339-45.
169. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.CJ. 14 (June 27).
170. Id.
20-21, at 21-22.
171. Id. 18, at 20-21.
172. Id. 1 93, at 54 (quation and citation omitted). Testimony during oral argument
in this case elaborated on what exactly the activity of the contras consisted of prior to
the United States' involvement. Id. T 93, at 53-54. Prior to the United States'
involvement, the contras were "'just a few small bands very poorly armed, scattered
along the northern border of Nicaragua .... They did not have military effectiveness
and what they mainly did was rustling cattle and killing some civilians near the
borderlines."' Id. 9193, at 54 (citation omitted).
173. Id. 1 94-95, at 54-55. The United States at first the Sandinista government;
however, it then cut off aid to Nicaragua in 1981 and began supporting the contras
due to the Sandinistas' support for guerillas in El Salvador. Id. 1 18-19, at 20-21.
174. Id. 91113, at 63-64.
175. Id. %114, at 64.
176. See id. 1 95-112, at 55-63 (documenting in detail all of the varied forms of
assistance given to the contras by the United States).
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Agency ("CIA") had several purposes in undertaking the covert
operations in Nicaragua, including to:
"Build popular support in Central America and Nicaragua for an
opposition front that would be nationalistic [and] anti-Cuban ....
Support the opposition front through formation and training of
action teams to collect intelligence and engage in paramilitary and
political operations in Nicaragua and elsewhere.
Work primarily through non-Americans ....in
Financial support for the military operations of the contras was
available in the United States budget from 1981 until 1984, amounting
to approximately $96.5 million over those three years. 78
All
equipment, clothing, food, and artillery utilized by the contra forces
were supplied by the CIA.'79 The CIA paid salaries to the contra
forces, chose their leaders, and provided them with training in guerilla
warfare, weaponry, and field communications. 180 Additionally, the
CIA provided the contras with intelligence as to Nicaraguan troop
movement and gave
them tactical directives, such as not to destroy
8
farms and crops.1 '
The ICJ's opinion provided multiple, and sometimes contradictory,
standards for what level of participation in the contras' affairs was
required before the United States could be held responsible for the
contras' actions."8 This unfortunate feature of the decision has led to
much confusion over what standard, in fact, the court set.1' 3 The first
standard put forth in the decision required a showing that the United
States "created an armed opposition in Nicaragua."'" This standard
was reiterated later in the decision, stating that "the Court has not
been able to satisfy itself that the [United States] 'created' the contra
177. Id. 99, at 59 (quoting from excerpts of a confidential CIA plan, fragments of
which were published in the Washington Post).
178. See id. [ 95-96, at 55-57.

179. Id. 100, at 59 ("[AIll arms, munitions and military equipment, including
uniforms, boots and radio equipment, were acquired and delivered by the CIA.").
180. Id.
100-01, at 59, 112, at 63.
181. Id. 1 101-04, at 59-60.
182. See id. 18 & n.1, at 189-90 (Sep. Op. Ago, J.) ("I feel obliged to point out
that the Judgment exhibits some hesitancy, a few at least apparent contradictions and
a certain paucity of legal reasoning in seeking to substantiate the position the Court
takes on the points in question.").
183. Compare Prosecutor v. Tadi6
600 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber II May 7, 1997), availableat http://www.un.orglicty/tadic/
trialc2/judgement/tad-tj970507e.htm [hereinafter Tadi6 I (majority opinion)], with
Prosecutor v. Tadi6
3-4 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial
Chamber II May 7, 1997) (McDonald, J. dissenting), availableat http://www.un.org/
icty/tadic/trialc2/judgement/tad-tsojmcd970507e.htm [hereinafter Tadi6 I (McDonald,
J., dissenting)], and Tadi6 II (majority opinion), supra note 133, I99-115, at 40-47.
See Spelliscy, supra note 133, at 160-68; see also infra notes 247-75 and accompanying
text.
184. Military and ParamilitaryActivities, 1986 I.C.J. %94, at 54.
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force in Nicaragua." 1" Under this standard, the United States would
only be liable if it had invented the contra forces.'
The court stated a second standard for establishing liability at a
later point in the decision: "that all the operations launched by the
contra force, at every stage of the conflict, reflectf strategy and tactics
wholly devised by the United States."'' "s This standard appears to be
very similar to that required in Diplomatic and ConsularStaff." if the
contras followed specific commands from the United States in every
one of their operations, liability would attach to the United States for
the contras' actions. However, this standard seems to have been
expressly rejected by the court. A few pages after stating this
standard, the court found that "United States participation, even if
preponderant or decisive, in the financing, organizing, training,
supplying and equipping of the contras, the selection of its military or
paramilitary targets, and the planning of the whole of its operation, is
still insufficient in itself" to establish responsibility for the contras
actions.189 The ICJ wavered on the standard several more times 190
before settling on a final standard, "effective control."'9 If the United
States had effective control over the contras' operations, then the
United States was liable for all of the contras' actions: "it would in
principle have to be proved that [the United States] had effective
control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of
which the alleged violations were committed."'" Effective control is
regarded as the criterion for attaching
liability to a State for an
193
individual's actions under this decision.
The meaning of effective control is not exactly defined by the court.
Some of the relevant factors, however, can be gleaned from the
185. Id. 108, at 61 (emphasis omitted).
186. See id
187. Id. 1 106, at 61 (emphasis omitted). This standard was stated for a second
time in the decision, requiring that "all contra operations reflected strategy and tactics
wholly devised by the United States." Id. S 108, at 62 (emphasis omitted).
188. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran),
1980 I.C.J. 3, 59, at 29-30 (May 24).
189. Military and ParamilitaryActivities, 1986 I.CJ. T 115, at 64 (emphasis omitted;
remaining emphasis added).
190. The court stated that the standard is whether the contras were completely
dependent on the United States' aid, in all of its varied forms. Id. I 110, at 62. This
standard seems to then change into whether the contras "may be equated for legal
purposes with the forces of the United States." Id. T 110, at 62-63.
191. Id. 115, at 65.
192 Id.
193. See id. 18 n.1, at 189 (Sep. Op. Ago, J.) (stating that "[t]he underlying idea is
expressed most precisely in paragraph 115," which includes the effective control
standard); U.N. Articles Commentary, supra note 57, art. 8 cmt. 1 4, at 105-06;
Gregory Townsend, State Responsibility for Acts of De Facto Agents, 14 Ariz. J. Int'l
& Comp. L. 635, 643-44 (1997); Spelliscy, supra note 133, at 162-64 ("[Tihe better
explanation of what the ICJ was attempting to do in [Military and Paramilitary
Activities] is to use the dependence and control test and develop the notion of control
to mean effective control.").
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context in which the standard is put forth. 94 The court stated that all
of the varied and extensive forms of involvement that the United
States had with the contras, including the financial support, the
planning of their operations, and the selection of their targets, "even if
preponderant or decisive," were insufficient to attach liability to the
United States for the contras' actions. 95 Even if the United States had
general control over the contra force, and even if the contras were
highly dependent on the United States' aid, these factors alone could
not attach liability to the State. 96 Nicaragua needed to produce
evidence that the United States directed or enforced the perpetration
of acts contrary to human rights and humanitarian law in such a way
that the contras would not have committed those acts but for the
United States' involvement.' 97 Had Nicaragua produced such
evidence, the ICJ may have found that the United States had effective
control over the contras, and thus attach liability to the State. 19 The
mere encouragement of the contras' acts contrary to human rights and
humanitarian law was not enough to attach liability.' 99 The court
expressly held that the United States' encouragement via the
"Psychological Operations" manual did not attach liability to the State
for the contras' actions. 200 The dispositive point for the court,
therefore, was the fact that the contras would have committed these
acts with or without the United States' encouragement or
involvement.'
The standard to be gleaned from this case with respect to
statements from a head of state is twofold. First, no matter how
specific a statement is regarding a particular operation, the statement
alone will not attach liability to the State." The court must undertake
some analysis of control before attaching liability to the State.
Second, the dispositive factor in each case is whether the individual, in
light of the totality of the State's involvement, would have committed
the acts without the State's intervention.2° Therefore, any analysis of
whether the wrongdoings of an individual acting in conformity with a
statement from a head of State should attach liability to that State
must look not only to the command from the head of State, but also to
194. Military and ParamilitaryActivities, 1986 I.C.J.

18 n.1, at 189 (Sep. Op. Ago,

J.).
195. Id. 1 115, at 64-65.
196. Id.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. Id. 256, at 130, 292, No. 9, at 148.
200. Id. 292, No. 9, at 148; see infra note 335 and accompanying text.
201. Id. 1 115, at 64-65.
202. See id. 115, at 64-65, 256, at 130. The "Psychological Operations" manual
contained very explicit instructions. The court's refusal to attach liability on this fact
alone suggests that a mere command in itself cannot attach liability. See id.; see also
infra notes 331-39 and accompanying text.
203. See Military and ParamilitaryActivities, 1986 I.C.J. 115, at 64-65.
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the motivations behind the actions of the individual who responds to
the command.

The standard created in Military and ParamilitaryActivities seems
to conflict with the decision in Diplomatic and ConsularStaff, as the

statements from the United States, which were specific as to the
operations to be undertaken by the contras,.2 0 did not attach liability
to the United States for the contras' actions in conformity with those

statements. Judge Ago, however, in his Separate Opinion, clearly
stated that these decisions are not in conflict.2 5 Unfortunately, Judge
Ago did not specifically state how the effective control standard
related to the facts of Diplomatic and Consular Staff.2'

The

comparison, however, is not a difficult one. The effective control
standard relates to whether the individual in question would have
acted regardless of the assistance and command from the head of
State.'
The student militants who attacked the United States
Embassy in Iran on November 4, 1979, were part of a group of some
3000 demonstrators who were demonstrating against the United
States' admittance of the former Shah of Iran into its borders,
allegedly for medical treatment.2 1 There had been a demonstration
on November 1 of almost 5000 people in front of the United States
Embassy, but on that day, announcements on the radio and by a
religious leader at the main demonstration at another location in the
city specifically told the demonstrators not to go near the Embassy.21
This would suggest that without these exhortations to the contrary,
the people would have attacked the Embassy. The demonstrators
204. See infra notes 331-39 and accompanying text.
205. Military and ParamilitaryActivities, 1986 I.CJ. 1 18-19, at 190 (Sep. Op. Ago,
J.). Judge Ago states that
I am above all inclined to regret that the Judgment does not refer explicitly
to the precedent provided by the Judgment of 24 May 1980 in the case
concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran. The
Court seems to me to have overlooked the fact that, at that time, it was faced
with a situation in many ways similar to the present one.... I can only regret
that the Court has not seized the opportunity to emphasize, by appropriate
references [to Diplomatic and ConsularStaffl, a confirmation of the position
it took before and of the theoretical reasoning developed in support, so as to
underline the continuity and solidity of the jurisprudence.
Id Judge Ago was the Special Rapporteur in charge of drafting the Articles on State
Responsibility for the International Law Commission prior to being appointed to the
International Court of Justice. See Rosenne, supra note 58, at 28.
206. Judge Ago merely states that the decision rested on the fact that the
"'militants' in question had no official status of any kind as agents or organs of the
State and there was nothing to prove that they had in fact acted in the name and on
behalf of the Iranian authorities," but does not connect this to the Military and
Paramilitary Activities' standard of effective control. Military and Paramilitary
Activities, 1986 I.C.J. 1 18, at 190 (Sep. Op. Ago, J.).
207. See supra notes 191-203 and accompanying text.
208. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980
I.C.J. 3, H 15-17, at 11-12 (May 24).
209. Id.1 16, at 11-12.
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who overtook the Embassy on November 4, therefore, most likely
would have attacked the United States Embassy regardless of the
Ayatollah's address.2 0 Therefore, like the Nicaraguan contras, the
student militants would have attacked the Embassy without the
Ayatollah's support.211 This fact establishes, under the standard of
12
effective control espoused in Military and ParamilitaryActivities,
that Iran had no control over the militants and, therefore, that the
State could not be held liable for their actions.213 Additionally, the
ICJ noted that the militants themselves "claimed credit for having
devised and carried out the plan to occupy the Embassy," further
suggesting that they would have attacked the Embassy with or without
the Ayatollah's statement. 214 Therefore, these two cases create a
similar standard, albeit from two different perspectives. Diplomatic
and Consular Staff considered attaching liability through the
specificity of the State's statement alone.2 5 Military and Paramilitary
Activities looked at the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether the individuals in question would have acted a certain way
regardless of the State's involvement.2"6
B. The Flexible Standardas a Basis for Attaching Liability to the State
The flexible standard allows the court to consider the totality of the
circumstances before determining what level of command or control
by a State is necessary to attach liability to that State. The specificity
of the command necessary to establish liability on the part of the State
under the flexible standard varies with the type of action committed
by the individual: the more specific the individual's actions, the more
specific the command must be. The degree of control necessary
depends on the characteristics of the individual or group of individuals
controlled: the more organized the group is, the less control a State
must exert over the group to attach liability. This standard was
established in two separate cases that both advocated flexible
standards meant to maximize the accountability of the State.
1. Command Under the Flexible Standard
The flexible standard for control is most clearly established in the
decision of the USICC in Alfred Short v. Iran.2 17 Although the
majority upheld the strict standard of specificity required by the ICJ in
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id. J 59, at 29-30.
See id.
See supra notes 191-203 and accompanying text.
See Diplomaticand ConsularStaff, 1980 I.C.J. 9159, at 30.
Id.
See supra notes 143-49 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 191-203 and accompanying text.
Alfred L.W. Short v. Iran, 16 Iran-U.S. C1. Trib. Rep. 76 (1987).

2002]

STATE RESPONSIBILITY

2631

Diplomatic and ConsularStaff,218 the dissenting judge, Judge Brower,
iterated
an alternative, flexible standard for attaching liability to
9
21

Iran.

In Short, Alfred Short sued Iran before the USICC for his wrongful
expulsion from Iran as a result of the Ayatollah's exhortations against
Americans and the Iranian citizens' response to those exhortations. -0
Short claimed that as a result of the Ayatollah's statements,
"Americans were singled out in the course of the Islamic Revolution
and threatened, harassed, beaten and in the most tragic cases,
murdered, by the followers of the Ayatollah Khomeini.""1 Short
himself was threatened and chased by mobs, shot at in his home, and
stalked by an ominous man in black.-- These actions eventually led
him to send his family away and, finally, to remove himself from Iran
at the behest of his employer, Lockheed-Martin. '
The USICC found that Iran was not responsible for damages
resulting from Short's expulsion from Iran. 24 The commission based
its decision on two factors. First, Short failed to identify a specific
agent of the Iranian State that expelled him from the country.2
Short's claim relied on the fact that the supporters of the revolution in
Iran generally created an atmosphere within Iran that was hostile to
United States citizens remaining there and that that atmosphere
forced him to leave.'
The USICC denied this basis of liability,
stating that the actions of supporters of a revolution are not
attributable to the State, unless the supporters rise to the level of de
facto agents under Diplomatic and Consular Staff.-' n Second, the
commission looked at whether the Ayatollah's statements against
America and Americans within Iran could have made the supporters

218. See supra text accompanying notes 143-49.
219. Short, 16 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. Rep. 1 32, at 101 (Brower, J., dissenting).
220. Id. 1 17, at 80,1 23, at 81.
221. Id. 17, at 80.
22Z Id. 919
18-21, at 80-81.
223. Id. 120, at 80, 122, at 81.
224. Id. 11 34-35, at 85-86.
225. Id. 9134, at 85; cf Kenneth P. Yeager v. Iran, 17 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 92
(1987) (holding Iran responsible for damages resulting from the wrongful expulsion of
Yeager and his wife by de facto agents of Iran). Yeager was successful in his claim
because he was able to show (1) that he was forced to leave his home by individuals
claiming to be members of the "Revolutionary Guards" who wore distinctive
armbands of that organization, and (2) that he was detained in a hotel that was known
to be held by these Guards. Id. 9 41, at 103: see Townsend, supra note 193, at 649-50.
Liability in Yeager was easily established because Iran subsequently adopted the
actions of these Guards, making their actions attributable to the State. Townsend,
supra note 193, at 650; see U.N. Articles, supra note 16, art. 11. at 4. Short's claim, on
the other hand, was based on a more general theory that the Ayatollah incited the
Iranian populace to expel all American citizens. Short, 16 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 91
17-21, at 80-81.
226. Short, 16 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. T9 17-21, at 80-81.
227. Id. 9 34, at 85; see supra text accompanying notes 143-49.
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de facto agents of Iran in expelling American citizens.2" The
commission denied this basis for liability as well, finding that "these
pronouncements were of a general nature and did not specify that
Americans should be expelled en masse. '2 9 The majority reiterated
the standard established in Diplomatic and Consular Staff that the
statement must be specific to and about the operation undertaken by
the individuals for the State to be liable.230
Judge Brower's dissent in Short, however, attempted to lay out a
new standard under which liability could be attached to the State for
an individual's actions."l Judge Brower advocated finding liability
under a standard of constructive eviction, allowing the claimant to
recover damages if the claimant showed (1) that the circumstances in
the country left him with no reasonable choice but to leave, (2) that
behind these circumstances there was some intent to have the
individual expelled, and (3) that these circumstances were attributable
to the State.32 Based on the voracity and consistency of the
Ayatollah's declarations against the United States, Brower felt that
Short should be able to recover damages from Iran for constructive
eviction.233 Specifically, Brower noted that the Ayatollah had stated
that "'[f]inal victory will come when all foreigners are out of the
country. '234 Although Brower accepted the specificity requirement
espoused in Diplomatic and Consular Staff when the action
complained of is a singular, particular act, he denied that such a
standard was necessary when the activity complained of involved
"more general, less cataclysmic" activity by the individuals.23 Judge
Brower reasoned that, because the actions involved in constructive
eviction are more general in nature, the statements required to attach
liability to the State for the eviction need not be as specific as those
required to attach liability for a single act.z 6 Thus, under Judge
Brower's standard, a State could be held responsible for more general
acts, such as constructive eviction or inciting mass violence,237 even
228. Short, 16 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. T 35, at 85-86.
229. Id. J 35, at 85.
230. Id. 35, at 85-86.

231. Id. 2, at 87-88 (Brower, J., dissenting).
232. Id.

2, at 87 (Brower, J., dissenting). Judge Brower analogized this type of

liability to the doctrine of constructive eviction in American property law. Id.
(Brower, J., dissenting).

Furthermore, the majority had expressly allowed for the

possibility of constructive eviction in its decision. Id.
(Brower, J., dissenting).

30, at 83-84; id.

2, at 87

233. Id.
6-12, at 89-92 (Brower, J., dissenting) (documenting the many
statements made by the Ayatollah against the United States).
234. Id. 11, at 92 (Brower, J., dissenting).
235. Id. 14 & n.10, at 93-94 (Brower, J., dissenting).
236. Id.
14-15, at 93-94 (Brower, J., dissenting).
237. See id. (Brower, J., dissenting). This standard could also be applied to
situations such as the genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994 and of the Muslims
and Croats in Bosnia in the early 1990s. See Tadi6 I (majority opinion), supra note
183, T1 80-178; Philip Gourevitch, We Wish To Inform You That Tomorrow We Will
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where the statements from the head of State were not very specific.
This standard correlates the required specificity of the State's
command with the specificity of the act alleged to determine whether
liability should be attached.
2. Control Under the Flexible Standard
The standard of effective control espoused by the ICJ in Military
and Paramilitary Activities was recently reconsidered by the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY")
in Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadi6.' - The Trial Chamber and Appeals
Chamber's decisions demonstrate that the strict standard established
in Military and ParamilitaryActivities is neither completely settled nor
entirely supported in the international community.
The Tadi6 decisions concern the actions of Dusko Tadi6, alleged to
have committed various acts of torture and murder on civilians at the
Omarska concentration camp and during the Serbian attack on
Kozarac and other villages in Bosnia. 239 Tadid was a Serbian national
living in Bosnia, a supporter of the Greater Serbia cause, and a
member of the Serb Democratic Party ("SDS").4
The modem
Greater Serbia movement began in the late 1980s as the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia began to break apart.24' This movement
eventually led to the reformation of Serbia, Kosovo, and Montenegro
as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ("FRY") and the separation of
the Serb population in Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina from the
other ethnic groups, forming Serbian municipalities within those
countries, such as the Republika Srpska in Bosnia.-'2 Tadi6 played a
significant role in the Serbian politics of this region, and was rewarded
for his efforts by being promoted to political leader of Kozarac after it
was "ethnically cleansed."243 In 1993, Tadi6 left his post in the Serbian

Be Killed With Our Families: Stories From Rwanda (1998). In Rwanda, Hutu Power
activists utilized the radio to disseminate propaganda against the Tutsis, which
ultimately led to genocide. Gourevitch, supra, at 99-100, 110-15. The broadcasts from
the radio were general in nature, advocating the mass murder, rape, and pillaging of
the Tutsi population and their property, as opposed to directing a specific attack. Id.
Similarly, in Yugoslavia from the late 1980s to the early 1990s the Serbs utilized local
radio and television stations to incite the local Serbian population to commit violence
and to terrify the Muslim and Croat populations. See Tadid I (majority opinion), supra
note 183,
88-93. The Hutu Power government or the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia provide examples of states that could be held responsible for general,
widespread acts by individuals in accordance with their more general statements.
238. Tadi I (majority opinion), supra note 183.
239. Id. [45-51.
240. Id. 188.
241. Id. 71.
242 Id. I 97-102.
243. Id.
186-88.
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government in Bosnia and fled to Germany, where he was finally
arrested and transferred to the ICTY in The Hague.24
The relevant portion of the Trial Chamber's decision concerned
whether the conflict in Bosnia qualified as an international conflict
under the Geneva Conventions. 45 Specifically, the court had to
determine whether the Republika Srpska and its armed forces were de
facto agents of the government of the FRY, a determination that
would qualify the conflict in Bosnia as international.246 The Trial
Chamber cited Military and ParamilitaryActivities as containing the
standard to be used in making this determination, specifically citing
the effective control standard. 47 The Trial Chamber understood the
effective control standard as requiring both "command and
control."248
Under this standard, the court found that the Republika Srpska and
its forces, the Vojska Republika Srpska ("VRS"), merely coordinated
with the FRY and its army, the Jugoslavenska Narodna Armija
("JNA"), 249 and that "[c]oordination is not the same as command and
control."" 0 Although the VRS military received aid from the JNA,
including plans, funding, and equipment, the court found that this was
not equivalent to command and control by the JNA because there was
no "evidence of orders having been received from [the FRY] which
circumvented or overrode the authority of the [VRS] Corps
Commander."'" Like the Nicaraguan contras, 2 the VRS forces and
the Republika Srpska would have acted with or without the support of
the FRY. The court compared the support of the FRY to that of the
United States in Military and Paramilitary Activities.-53 The Trial
Chamber noted that, just as the United States' aid did not override
but merely supported the contras' aims, so too did the FRY's support;
therefore, the VRS and the Republika Srpska were not agents of the
JNA or the FRY.' The Republika Srpska was a totally independent
State, having declared independence on January 9, 1992, and,
therefore, was not commanded or controlled by the FRY.25 The Trial
Chamber found that there was "no evidence on which [it could]
confidently conclude that the armed forces of the Republika Srpska,
and the Republika Srpska as a whole, were anything more than mere
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Id. T 192.
Id.
559-60.
Id. 584.
Id.
585, 595.
Id. 598.
See Spelliscy, supra note 133, at 164-65.
Tadi6 I (majority opinion), supra note 183, 598.
Id. 91601.
See supra text accompanying notes 197-201.
Tadid I (majority opinion), supra note 183, 91$602-04.
Id.
Id. 1 599.

2002]

STATE RESPONSIBILITY

2635

allies, albeit highly dependent allies, of the Government of the

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. ' ' 15 6 The VRS and the Republika

Srpska had the goal of a strong Serbian Nation as did the FRY;
however, the two were separate forces.3

The fact that the VRS and

the Repulika Srpska would have acted without the FRY or JNA's aid
meant that the FRY did not have effective control over the VRS or

the Republika Srpska and could not be held responsible for their
actions. The conflict, therefore, was not international and Article 2 of

the Geneva Conventions did not apply. "
Judge McDonald dissented from the Trial Chamber's decision for
two alternative reasons: (1) the decision was wrong because the
actions of the VRS and the Republika Srpska met the standard for
effective control;2s9 and (2) the decision was wrong because the
standard of effective control was not applicable in this case.' Judge
McDonald cited the fact that the VRS was created as a "legal fiction"
in response to the United Nations' demand that the FRY pull out of
Bosnia, and remained substantially under the same direction and
control as before its creation out of the JNA.2 6' The actions of the
VRS, therefore, met the effective control standard iterated in Military
and ParamilitaryActivities, because the VRS were not only effectively
controlled by the JNA, but effectively were a renamed branch of the
JNA. 262
Alternatively, Judge McDonald argued that the standard of
effective control was neither the standard created by Military and
2 63
Paramilitary Activities nor the standard applicable in this case.
256. Id. T 606.
257. Id. 604.
258. Id. 91 607-08.
259. Tadi6 I (McDonald, J., dissenting). supra note 183, 1 5-15.
260. Id.
16-34 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
261. Id.
7, 10 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
262. Id.
7-8, 15 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
263. Id. %$ 16-34 (McDonald, J., dissenting). Most authorities regard the effective
control standard as the authoritative standard created by the ICJ in Military and
ParamilitaryActivities. See Tadid II (majority opinion), supra note 133,
145, at 62;
Prosecutor v. Tadid 9 8, at 152 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, App.
Chamber July 15, 1999) (Sep. Op. Shahabuddeen, J.), available at http:vlwww.un.orgl
icty/Tadic/appeal/judgement/tad-aj990715e.pdf [hereinafter Tadi6 II (Sep. Op.
Shahabuddeen, J.)]; supra note 193 and accompanying text. Even if it were assumed,
however, that dependency and control was the standard created in Military and
ParamilitaryActivities, Judge McDonald, in summarily stating that the facts meet this
standard, ignored the detailed discussion in the Trial Chamber's opinion of why the
facts did not meet the standard for dependency and control. See Tadid I (majority
opinion), supra note 183, T 602-05. In Military and ParamilitaryActivities, the ICJ
stated that if the contras were dependent on the United States' aid such that the
United States had the potential to control them, and in fact utilized that potential for
control, the contras would be de facto agents of the State. Military and Paramilitary
Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14, 11 109-12, at 6263 (June 27). Although this standard was merely a step in the development of the
effective control standard, the ICJ held that the United States' aid, even if evincing a
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Judge McDonald stated that the ICJ created the effective control

standard as an alternative basis for liability, establishing prior to that
the standard of dependence and control.26" Under the standard of
dependence and control, Judge McDonald stated that the FRY would
be responsible for the VRS and Republika Srpska's actions because
they were so dependent on the JNA's financial
and technical support
265
that the JNA and FRY had control over them.
Finally, Judge McDonald argued that the facts of Tadi6 I were
significantly different from those considered in Military and
ParamilitaryActivities, such that the effective control standard was

not applicable.2 66 She stated that Tadi6 I was concerned with Tadid's
responsibility as an individual as opposed to the State's
responsibility.267 Additionally, she noted that the VRS and Republika
Srpska were in fact nationals of the FRY and wished to become a part
of the FRY, unlike the contras and the United States, who wished to
remain separate.2" Judge McDonald held that these differences
made
26 9
the standard in Military and ParamilitaryActivities inapposite.
The Appeals Chamber's opinion in Tadi6 II established the flexible
standard for control. In formulating this standard, the Chamber chose
to disapprove of the ICJ's decision in Military and Paramilitary
Activities and Judge McDonald's opinion in Tadi6 L270 The Appeals
Chamber first concluded that Military and Paramilitary Activities
provided the standard for agency in both considerations of individual
and State responsibility.27

The court held that the two types of

responsibility were governed by the same standard because the
preliminary question in analyzing both circumstances is on what
general situation of dependency, did not amount to de facto agency because there was
no control on the part of the United States. See id.
112-15, at 63-65.
All the forms of United States participation mentioned above, and even the
general control by the respondent State over a force with a high degree of
dependency on it, would not in themselves mean, without further evidence,
that the United States directed or enforced the perpetration of the acts
contrary to human rights and humanitarian law alleged by the applicant
State.
Id. 115, at 64 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Trial Chamber stated that the FRY
and the JNA merely had "the potential for control inherent in the relationship of
dependency which such financing produced" over the Republika Srpska and VRS
forces. Tadi6 I (majority opinion), supra note 183, 602. Although there was the
potential for control inherent in the relationship between the JNA and the VRS, this
potential was not acted upon. Judge McDonald did not address this argument.
Therefore, even if this were the correct standard, the facts of this case did not meet it.
264. Tadi6 I (McDonald, J., dissenting), supra note 183, I 22-25.
265. Id. 25 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
266. Id. 26-34 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
267. Id. 27 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
268. Id. 1 29 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
269. Id. IT 27-29 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
270. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27); see Spelliscy, supra note 133, at 166-68.
271. Tadid II (majority opinion), supra note 133,
102-05, at 4142.
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"conditions... under international law an individual may be held to
act as a de facto organ of a State."' 2 - The Appeals Chamber,
therefore, committed itself to analyzing the decision in Military and
ParamilitaryActivities.273 The court determined that the standard in
Military and ParamilitaryActivities was effective control, 4 rejecting
Judge McDonald's construction of a dual standard. 5 The Appeals
Chamber, however, then determined that the Military and
Paramilitary Activities standard was unpersuasive, arguing for its
removal as the standard for state responsibility. 76
The Appeals Chamber rejected the effective control standard for
two reasons: (1) effective control thwarts the principle underlying the
doctrine of state responsibility, which is accountability; and (2)
effective control does not conform with existing judicial and State
practice. 27 The court found that the effective control standard was
too strict in that it allowed a State to escape responsibility in a
situation where the State generally controlled an organized group? 9
The Appeals Chamber held that the standard for de facto agency
liability should remain a determination of whether the State had
control over the individuals; however, the court stated that "[tihe
degree of control may... vary according to the factual circumstances
of each case."' The Appeals Chamber found that the basic notion of
accountability and of holding a State responsible for the actions of
individuals with whom it conspires was not fostered by the
burdensome standard of effective control.28 The court held that
[i]t can be maintained that the whole body of international law on
State responsibility is based on a realistic concept of accountability,
which disregards legal formalities and aims at ensuring that States
entrusting some functions to individuals or groups of individuals
must answer
2 for their actions, even when they act contrary to their
directives. 8

272. Id. 104, at 41-42 (emphasis omitted).
273. Id. 1 102-05, at 41-42.
274. Id. IT 106-14, at 42-46. Interestingly, the court defines the effective control
standard as "the issuance of specific orders or instructions relating to single military
actions." Id. 1 145, at 62. In defining effective control as also requiring a specific
command, the Appeals Chamber lends further support to the conclusion of this Note,
that the standard created by the ICJ for effective control and command are
intertwined, both being required to attach liability to the State. See supra Part IL.A;
infra Part III.A.1.
275. Tadi6 II (majority opinion), supra note 133, 1 106-14, at 4246.
276. Id. 1115, at 47.
277. Id. %%
116-23, at 47-51.
278. Id. 191 124-45, at 51-62.
279. Id. 9191
120-22, at 49-50.
280. Id. 1117, at 47.
281. Id. 91121, at 49-50.
282- Id
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The court next addressed the disjunction between judicial and state
practice and the effective control test. The Appeals Chamber upheld
the effective control standard with respect to individuals and
unorganized groups because state and judicial practice supported
utilizing the effective control test in those cases. 283 With respect to
militarily organized groups of individuals not formally associated with
the State, however, the court found that state and judicial practice
allowed for a more general situation of control to suffice in attaching
liability to the controlling State.'
The court cited several cases in
support of this observation, all of which held the State responsible for
the actions of an organized military group without making any
findings as to the State's effective control over the group. 85 The
Appeals Chamber held that this lack of investigation into the control
exerted by the State created a lesser standard of general control that
would be sufficient to attach liability to the State for the actions of a
hierarchical organization. 6
The court, in dicta, also noted the existence of a third standard for
attaching liability to the State: "This test is the assimilation of
individuals to State organs on account of their actual behaviour within
the structureof the' State
(and regardless of any possible requirement of
'
State instructions).287 The standard holds that where the individual is

essentially assimilated into the structure of the organs of the State, the
State should be held responsible for the actions of the individual.28s
Having established these three standards, the court moved on to
discuss the application of the general control standard to the FRY and
the Republika Srpska.
The Appeals Chamber found that the Bosnian Serb forces were de
facto agents of the FRY because the VRS remained essentially the
same branch of the JNS as before its renaming.289 The court held that
[e]ven if less explicit forms of command over military operations
were practised and adopted in response to increased international
scrutiny, the link between the [JNA] and VRS clearly went far
beyond mere coordination or cooperation between allies and in
effect, the renamed Bosnian Serb army still comprised one army
under the290 command of the General Staff of the [JNA] in
Belgrade.

Evidence of control by the FRY and the JNA overriding the authority
of the leaders of the VRS was unnecessary because of the general
283. Id. 1 124, at 51.

284. Id. 124, at 51, $ 130-31, at 55-56.
285. Id. I 125-29, at 51-55 (citations omitted); see infra notes 395-402 and
accompanying text.
286. Id. 1 131, at 56.
287. Id. 141, at 60.
288. Id. TT 142-44, at 60-61.
289. Id. $ 151, at 63-66.
290. Id. 152, at 66-67.
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situation of control between and the shared military objectives of the

JNA and VRS. 291

The standard advocated by the Appeals Chamber in Tadi6 H
closely resembles the standard iterated by Judge Brower in Short.Z
In his dissent in Short, Judge Brower sought to establish a standard for
command that would correlate the requisite amount of specificity in
the command with the factual circumstances alleged. 3 The more
specific the actions alleged, the more specific the command would
have to be to attach liability to the State. This standard mirrors the
standard established by the Appeals Chamber. The Appeals
Chamber held that "[t]he degree of control may... vary according to
the factual circumstances of each case."''
The difference between
these two flexible standards is that the Appeals Chamber's standard
varies depending upon the individual or group of individuals
concerned, while Judge Brower's standard depends upon the totality
of the circumstances. Nevertheless, both of these standards allow for
flexibility in the analysis of command and control to maximize the
accountability of states.
C. Early Arbitral Courts' Understandingof "Command" and
"Control"
A comparison of two early arbitral awards might clarify the
distinction between the specificity requirement in Diplomatic and
Consular Staff and Military and Paramilitary Activities,-' and the
notion advanced by Judge Brower and the Appeals Chamber in Tadi6
II that a State can be liable for inciting more general actions."6
Donoughho is an example of a specific action taken by a group of
individuals that correspondingly required a more specific command
from the official to attach liability to the State."" In Donoughho, the
USMGCC awarded the heirs of Cyrus Donoughho compensation
from Mexico for his murder during a raid by a State-organized
posse.298 Donoughho was one of several men employed by an
American mining company to oversee its operations in Mexico.'
One evening, the wife of a local carpenter sought refuge at the mine
from her abusive husband.3 ° The carpenter was enraged and sought
the aid of a local judge, Don Jos6 Maria Salazar, in the retrieval of his
291. Id.

153, at 67.

292. See supra notes 231-37 and accompanying text.
293. See supra text accompanying notes 235-36.
294. Tadid II (majority opinion), supra note 133, 1117, at 47 (emphasis omitted).
295. See supra text accompanying notes 143-49, 191-203.
296. See supra notes 235-37, 276-91 and accompanying text.
297. Donoughho (U.S. v. Mex.), 3 Moore's Arbitrations 3012, 3014 (Claims
Comm'n 1864).
298. Id. at 3013-14.
299. Id. at 3012.
300. Id.
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wife.301 Salazar demanded that the fugitive wife, and the woman at
the mine who was harboring her, appear before him.3 2 In response,
the women sent notice that they could not come because of the late
hour. 3 Salazar then organized a posse of local men "with a view to
their going to the company's house for the purpose of taking [the]
wife by force." 3" After a second entreaty for the wife's return failed,
Salazar sent his "posse comitatus... to proceed to the home and take
3 5 The posse went to the company's house
the woman out by force.""
and a battle ensued wherein Donoughho was killed and two other
Americans were wounded.3 °6
The Claims Commission found the organization and conduct of the
posse to be "most unjustifiable," and held Mexico responsible for
Salazar's actions in organizing and directing it.307 Salazar's actions
38
attached liability to the State because he was an organ of the State;
however, the actions of the posse in murdering Donoughho were also
attributed to the Mexican State. 3 9 Because Salazar created the posse
and told them what to do and where to go, the posse was deemed to
be a de facto agent of the State.310 The command to retrieve the
fugitive wife was very specific and thus corresponded to the specific
nature of the operation itself.311 Since the operation undertaken was
very specific, Salazar's involvement with the posse also312 must have
satisfied a specific standard to impose liability on Mexico.
A comparison can be made between the standard for liability in
Donoughho and that in Jeannotat.313 In Jeannotat,the USMGCC held
Mexico responsible for damage to the complainant's store caused by
prisoners released from a local jail by an officer of the Mexican
army.314 General Salgado released the prisoners from the jail and
incited them and some other members of the town to loot and plunder
the village, during the course of which Jeannotat's store was
damaged.315 The Commission found that "without the arrival of the
military force... there would [not] have been any inclination to
301. Id.

302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

Id.
Id.
Id.

Id. at 3013.
Id.

307. Id. at 3013-14.
308. See U.N. Articles, supra note 16, art. 4, at 2-3, art. 7, at 3.
309. Donoughho, 3 Moore's Arbitrations at 3014.
310. See id. at 3013-14.
311. See id.
312. Id.
The Claims Commission expressly stated that "the disastrous
consequences of that night were entirely due to the improper conduct of the
authorities [Salazar] on the occasion." Id. at 3014
313. Jeannotat (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 Moore's Arbitrations 3673 (Claims Comm'n 1875).
314. Id. at 3673.
315. Id. at 3674.
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commit such acts of violence. 31 6 The command in this case was
merely inciting the individuals to commit general acts of violence and
destruction. The general nature of the actions, however, meant that
the command did not have to be very specific to1attach
liability to the
7
State as under Judge Brower's standard in Short.
Jeannotat closely mirrors the flexible standard iterated in Judge
Brower's opinion in Short and the Appeals Chamber's decision in

Tadi6 11.318 The more general violence in Jeannotat attached liability
even though the court did not find specific commands. 9 As Judge
Brower opined in Short, where the act complained of is of a more
general nature, a more general command should be enough to attach
liability to the State.32 Furthermore, in accordance with the standard
iterated in Tadi6 II, the control exercised by the State in Jeannotatwas
more general, allowing the factual circumstances to be considered
before liability was imposed.32' This more general standard for
liability can be compared with the strict standard utilized in
Donoughho, which mirrors that of the ICJ in Diplomatic and Consular
Staff and Military and ParamilitaryActivities.' In Donoughho, the
USMGCC noted as dispositive the fact that Salazar organized and
directed the posse to commit the specific act of retrieving the fugitive
wife. 31 The specific nature of the command corresponded to the
specific nature of the act, mirroring the specificity requirement
expounded in Diplomaticand ConsularStaff.-24 The posse would also
not have acted without Salazar's direction, which would meet the
standard for effective control under Military and Paramilitary
Activities.
III. CREATING A STANDARD FROM THIS PRECEDENT
Having explored the myriad of cases, the pieces must now be put
together. This part seeks to combine and reconcile the standards
found within the Articles on State Responsibility, discussed in Part I,
with the notions of command and control espoused by the courts. An
examination of these authorities demonstrates the disjunction
316. Id
317. See supra notes 235-37 and accompanying text.
318. See Jeannotat,4 Moore's Arbitrations at 3674.
319. See id
320. See supra notes 235-37 and accompanying text.
321. See supra text accompanying notes 280-82, 316. The Tadk Appeals Chamber,
however, would most likely not have attached liability in Jeannotat because the mob
was unorganized. The State's action, therefore, would have had to have met the strict
standard of effective control under that opinion. See supra notes 275-86 and
accompanying text.
322. Compare Donoughho (U.S. v. Mex.), 3 Moore's Arbitrations 3012, 3014 (Gen.
Claims Comm'n 1864), with United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran
(U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 59, at 29-30 (May 24).
323. Donoughho,3 Moore's Arbitrations at 3014.
324. See supra text accompanying notes 143-49.
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between the standard codified in the Articles on State Responsibility
and that contained within the decisions of the ICJ and other judicial
bodies. Furthermore, this part outlines possible rationales for this
disjunction, looking at trends in the doctrine of state responsibility,
and how they might affect the future understanding and
implementation of the Articles on State Responsibility.
A. Combiningthe StandardsEmbodied Within Precedent with Those
Codified in the Articles on State Responsibility
Although the Commentary to the Articles on State Responsibility
implies that Article 8 was developed in correlation with the decisions
of the ICJ and other courts, 31 this implication is not entirely true. A
comparison of these standards reveals that the Articles establish a
more lenient standard for imposing liability on a State than that
developed by the courts.
1. The Discrepancy Between the Articles on State Responsibility and
the Courts
The Articles on State Responsibility emphasize in the Commentary
to Article 8 that a State's "instructions," "direction," or "control" may
attach liability to the State for the actions of individuals.32 Thus, if a
State merely gives instructions to the individual, which she then
carries out, the State is liable for her actions.3 27 An examination of
either direction or control would not be necessary. 328 This standard
does not coincide with the judicial precedent.
The decisions of judicial bodies on the subject of state responsibility
for the actions of individuals suggest that all three of these factors
must exist before liability will be attached to the State.329 Although

the courts have not expressly connected these three factors together, it
is clear from the decisions as a whole that all three of these
requirements must be met for liability to attach.330
In Military and ParamilitaryActivities, the ICJ carefully avoided
saying that the manual disseminated by the United States regarding
psychological warfare tactics was a "direction" or "instruction" to

325. See U.N. Articles Commentary, supra note 57, art. 8 cmt. I 3-5, at 104-07.
326. Id. art. 8 cmt.
7-8, at 108-09.
327. Id. 2, at 104.
328. Id. 7-8, at 108-09.
329. Cf Alfred L.W. Short v. Iran, 16 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 76, 2, at 87 (1987)
(Brower, J., dissenting).
330. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 115, at 64-65 (June 27) (finding that even if the United States
had planned the whole of the contras' operation, liability for the contras' actions
would not attach to the State because the "acts could well be committed by members
of the contras without the control of the United States" (emphasis omitted)).
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undertake any actions contrary to international humanitarian law. 31
Judge Jennings, in his dissenting opinion, noted this quirk in the
language chosen by the court to describe the manual, musing that
using a catch word, like "instruction" or "direction," would attach
liability to the State, and that the3court, therefore, opted for the nonlegal phrase of "encouragement." 3
The facts of Military and ParamilitaryActivities, however, show that
the United States both directed and instructed the contras to
undertake specific operations.333 The court found "it clear that a
number of military and paramilitary operations by [the contras] were
decided and planned, if not actually by United States advisors, then at
least in close collaboration with them." 3-1 Additionally, the manual
given to the contra forces by the CIA contained extremely specific
instructions:
If possible, professional criminals will be hired to carry out specific
selective "jobs."
Specific tasks will be assigned to others, in order to create a
"martyr" for the cause, taking the demonstrators to a confrontation

with the authorities, in order to bring about uprisings or shootings,
which will cause the death of one or more persons, who would
become the martyrs, a situation that should be made use of
immediately against the regime, in order to create greater
conflicts.335

Such statements appear to meet Article 8's standard.-3 The
Commentary expressly states that liability should attach to a State for
the actions of individuals "who, though not specifically commissioned
by the State and not forming part of its police or armed forces.... are
instructed to carry out particular missions abroad." 3 Although the
ICJ did not use the terms "instruction" or "direction," the United
States did give instructions and directions to the contras under the
Article 8 standard 31 The ICJ's failure to attach liability to the United
331. Id
121-22, at 68-69, 91
255, at 129-30, 9 292, No. 9, at 148.
332. ld at 538 (Jennings, J., dissenting). Judge Jennings stated that "the
dissemination of this manual does not, in international law, make unlawful acts of the
contras into acts imputable to the United States. This is presumably why the Court's
rebuke is in the non-technical terms of 'encouragement' of unlawful acts." Id.
(emphasis omitted).
333. Id. 1 101, at 59-60.
334. Id. 106, at 61.
335. Id. 9 118, at 66 (quoting from the report provided by the CIA to the
Nicaraguan contra forces entitled "Psychological Operations," a section entitled
"Control of mass concentrations and meetings").
336. U.N. Articles, supra note 16, art. 8, at 3.
337. U.N. Articles Commentary, supra note 57, art. 8 cmt. T12, at 104.
338. See supra notes 331-35 and accompanying text.
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States given these specific commands suggests that the court required
additional evidence of an agency relationship, beyond instruction or
direction, to attach liability.339

The dispositive factor for the ICJ in this case was the lack of control

the United States exerted over the contras.340

The fact that the

contras were in existence before the United States' involvement and
continued to fight against the Sandinista government after the United
States ceased to aid them showed that the United States did not
control the contras in the manner required to attach liability.311 The
actions of the contras had to be on behalf of the United States and
solely because of the United States' instruction and involvement in
order for the United States to be liable.2 Even given the clarity of
instruction and depth of the involvement of the United States in the
operations of the contras, the court refused to find the United States
responsible for the contras' actions because it did not control them in
this manner. 43 The ICJ held that the contras would have committed
the alleged acts of violence with or without the United States'
commands; hence the contras were not controlled by the United
States.3 4 Therefore, the precedent does not support the contention in
the Commentary to Article 8 that a finding of either instruction or
339. The Articles on State Responsibility were still in their draft form at the time of
the Military and Paramilitary Activities decision. See Military and Paramilitary
Activities, 1986 I.C.J. "18 n.1, at 189 (Sep. Op. Ago, J.). The ICJ, therefore, was
dealing with a different standard for attaching liability under Article 8 than that
contained in the Adopted Articles. See supra Part I.B. Discussing this decision in
relation to the Adopted Articles is legitimate, however, because the standard under
Draft Article 8 is comparable to the one adopted in the present Article 8. The
Commentary to Draft Article 8 states that, where "the person or group of persons
were actually appointed by organs of the State to discharge a particular function or to
carry out a particular duty.... they performed a given task at the instigation of those
organs." 1974 Yearbook, supra note 62, at 285. This is substantially similar to
paragraph 2 of the adopted Commentary accompanying Article 8. See U.N. Articles
Commentary, supra note 57, art. 8 cmt. 2, at 104. Furthermore, the ICJ never
quoted the Articles on State Responsibility in coming to its decision, thus the decision
can be viewed independently of the Draft Articles' standard. Only Judge Ago
mentioned the Draft Articles, although perhaps that is because he wrote the Draft
Articles. See Rosenne, supra note 58, at 25-30.
340. See supra text accompanying notes 191-203.
341. Military and ParamilitaryActivities, 1986 I.C.J.
108, at 61-62. The court
stated the following:
[i]t seems certain that members of the former Somoza National Guard,
together with civilian opponents to the Sandinista r6gime, withdrew from
Nicaragua soon after that r6gime was installed in Managua, and sought to
continue their struggle against it, even if in a disorganized way and with
limited and ineffectual resources, before the [United States] took advantage
of the existence of these opponents and incorporated this fact into its
policies vis-A-vis [Nicaragua].
Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 194-201.
342. See Military and ParamilitaryActivities, 1986 I.C.J.
114-15, at 64-65.
343. Id. T 115, at 64-65.
344. Id.
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control attaches liability. -" On the contrary, it appears from this
decision that both must exist to find liability.
2. Analysis of the Standard Created by Article 8
The question that remains is whether Article 8 does, in fact,
advocate for liability when there is no control. The Commentary
clearly states that the factors of command and control can each
individually attach liability. The way the Commentary defines these
terms through examples, however, suggests otherwise. In fact, the
Commentary suggests, through the way it uses and defines the terms
"instructions" and "directions," that these terms already contain some
It is disingenuous, therefore, to say that any of
aspect of control.'
these factors alone will attach liability, as each term already contains
the other two.
The
The first term defined in the Commentary is "instructions." '
Commentary defines this term as "conduct in fact authorized" by the
State.'
The case examples given to support this definition are
5 1 cases.
In
Zafiro,4 9 Stephens,3 50 and the Lehigh Valley RailroadZafiro, the court held the United States responsible for not stopping
the crew of a private merchant ship from raiding a village while it was
docked there. 5 The ship's officers stood by and let the crew run
wild. 33 This act was attributable to the United States because the
vessel was under the direct command of the Navy and was being used
as a naval supply ship.3" The "instructions" in Zafiro were more than
simple statements; the relationship between the United States and the
individuals evinced the elements of effective control described in
Military and ParamilitaryActivities.-5 The crew of the Zafiro would
not have been in that port if the United States had not commanded it
to be there. 3 6 As a result, the ship's directions to go to the port
already inherently contained the notion of control that the United
States had over the vessel.

345. See U.N. Articles Commentary, supra note 57, art. 8 cmt.

346.
347.
348.
349.

7, at 108.

See id art. 8 cmt. 9 2-3, at 104.
See id. art. 8 cmt. 12, at 104.
Id
(Gr. Brit. v. U.S.), 6 R.I.A.A. 160 (Arbitral Trib. 1925); see supra note 78 and

accompanying text.

350. (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.I.A.A. 265 (Gen. Claims Comm'n 1927): see supra note 78
and accompanying text.
351. (U.S. v. F.R.G.), 8 R.I.A.A. 225 .(Mixed Claims Comm'n 1939); (U.S. v.
F.R.G.), 8 R.I.A.A. 104 (Mixed Claims Comm'n 1932); (U.S. v. F.R.G.), 8 R.I.A.A. 84
(Mixed Claims Comm'n 1930); see supra text accompanying notes 152-64.
352. Zafiro, 6 R.I.A.A. at 161,164-65.
353. Id at 161, 164.

354. See id at 161.
355. See supra text accompanying notes 194-203.
356. See Zafiro, 6 R.I.A.A. at 164.
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Stephens involved auxiliaries of the Mexican army who had shot an
American citizen.357 The USMGCC held Mexico responsible for the
actions of the auxiliaries because, even though the auxiliaries were not
a part of the formal structure of the State, they were acting on behalf
of Mexico."' Again, this example inherently contains the notion of
control espoused in Military and Paramilitary Activities. The
auxiliaries would not have been standing at that post were it not for
the declaration of the Mexican government ordering them to be
there.35 9 The important analysis in the case was not the specificity of
the instructions given by the Mexican government, but rather the
control the government had over these auxiliaries. 60
The Lehigh Valley Railroad cases concerned the same assignment
of control. In these cases, there was significant analysis of what the
German authorities actually communicated to the individuals carrying
out the sabotage missions in America. The case, however, turned on
whether Germany controlled these individuals or whether they simply
committed the acts of sabotage on their own. 361 The examination of
the statements was a precursor to determining whether the individuals
were controlled by Germany in the sense that they would not have
committed the acts of sabotage but for the German government's
instructions.362
These case examples all demonstrate that even though the
Commentary says that it is only describing "instructions" from the
State, this is actually a misleading statement. In all of these examples,
although there was analysis of instruction, that analysis was focused
on the level of control evinced by those instructions and the totality of
Therefore, the Commentary's definition of
circumstances.
"instruction" already contains an element of control.
The analysis undertaken in the case examples is similar to the
reasoning behind the decision in Diplomatic and Consular Staff. In
that case, the ICJ's analysis also focused on the instructions given by
the Ayatollah Khomeini; 363 however, as Judge Ago noted in his
Separate Opinion in Military and Paramilitary Activities,"6 the
rationale in Diplomatic and Consular Staff is consistent with the
standard of effective control. Therefore, the failure of the instruction
357. Stephens (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.I.A.A. 265,

4-6, at 266-67 (Gen. Claims

Comm'n 1927).
358. Id.
359. See id.
360. See id.
361. See Lehigh Valley R.R. II (U.S. v. F.R.G.), 8 R.I.A.A. 225 (Mixed Claims
Comm'n 1939); Lehigh Valley R.R. (Rehearing Grant) (U.S. v. F.R.G.), 8 R.I.A.A.
104 (Mixed Claims Comm'n 1932); Lehigh Valley R.R. I (U.S. v. F.R.G.), 8 R.I.A.A.
84 (Mixed Claims Comm'n 1930).
362. See Woolsey, supra note 153, at 738-40.
363. See supra text accompanying notes 139-45.
364. (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 18, at 190 (June 27) (Sep. Op. Ago, J.).
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from the Ayatollah to attach liability to Iran for the students' actions
was because of both the lack of specificity of the statement itself, as
well as the lack of control Iran had over the students' actions. -'
The effective control standard in Military and Paramilitary
Activities was formulated as a command and control standard in the
Trial Chamber's opinion in Tadi6.3 This formulation supports Judge
Ago's statement that the standards in Diplomatic and Consular Staff
and Military and Paramilitary Activities were meant to be
complementary.367 Even the Appeals Chamber considered there to be
a significant aspect of command inherent in the notion of effective
control. 36s The ILC's construction of the term "instructions," in
following with precedent, thus contains the standard of control within
it. To state, therefore, that a finding of either of these two factors, as
opposed to both, is sufficient to attach liability to the State is
disingenuous, as "instruction" has been defined so as to already
contain aspects of control.
The Commentary also undertakes an analysis of the meaning of the
term "direction," but does not provide a definition.-" The term is
simply used in conjunction with the analysis of control: "Such conduct
will be attributable to the State only if it directed or controlled the
specific operation...."3 7 0 The Commentary then goes on to discuss
the meaning of "control" without giving "direction" a substantive
definition of its own.371 It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that the
analysis demanded to find "direction" is, in essence, the same as was
necessary under "instruction":3n for a State to be liable because of
directions given, there must be some evidence of control.
The final term, "control," is defined in the Commentary as the
standard espoused by the ICJ in Military and ParamilitaryActivities:
Therefore, control under Article 8 is effective control.- 4 The ILC
refers to three other cases in a footnote to elaborate on its definition
of control. 75 All three of these cases, however, fail to support the
standard under Article 8.
The first case mentioned in the footnote is Kenneth P. Yeager v.
Iran.37 6 Yeager dealt with whether Iran was responsible for the actions
365. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran). 1980
I.CJ. 3, 59, at 29-30 (May 24); see supra notes 139-45, 201-14 and accompanying
text.
366. Tadid I (majority opinion), supra note 183. IT 598-606.
367. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
368. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
369. See U.N. Articles Commentary, supra note 57, art. 8 cmt. 1 3, at 104.
370. Id.
371. See id art. 8 cmt. 3, at 104-05.
372. See supra notes 346-68 and accompanying text.
373. See U.N. Articles Commentary, supra note 57, art. 8 cmt. 4. at 105-06.
374. See supra text accompanying notes 191-203.
375. U.N. Articles Commentary, supra note 57, art. 8 cmt. 1 5 n.169, at 107.
376. 17 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 92 (1987); see supra note 225 and accompanying
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of certain "Revolutionary Guards" who forcibly expelled Kenneth
Yeager from Iran.377 The court admits that, in the case, it is not
considering any issue of de facto responsibility resulting from the
statements of the Ayatollah.3 71 Instead, the grounds the court found
for attaching liability to Iran relied primarily on Draft Article 8(b),379

a provision that attached liability to the State for the actions of
individuals in fact acting with governmental authority in the absence
of official governmental authority. 380 This provision is no longer a
part of Article 8, having been adopted in the Articles as Article 9.3sI
Therefore the standard in Yeager certainly would not illuminate the
standard for control under Article 8.
The footnote also cites Starrett Housing Corp. v. Iran;31 however,
this case also fails to give insight into the meaning of control. The ILC
cites to the court's unilateral statement that Iran is responsible for
Starrett's damages,3 3 but there is no explanation given for the court's
finding on this matter.3 8 Moreover, the issue in this case regards the
Iranian government acting through its organs and appointees, not
individuals acting as de facto agents.385 Therefore, any analysis would
most likely not offer meaningful insight into the standard for control
established under Article 8.
The footnote additionally references Loizidou v. Turkey, a case
before the European Court of Human Rights. 386 This case, however,
is also inapposite on the issue of responsibility for de facto agents
under Article 8 because Loizidou concerns Turkey's responsibility for
the actions of its own military forces. 381 The court found that Turkey
controlled the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus ("TRNC") for
text.
377. Yeager, 17 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 35, at 101.
378. Id.
35-36, at 101.
379. Id. 42, at 103. Although the court does mention the "on behalf of the

government" standard contained in Draft Article 8(a), the analysis of control focused
on the fact that the guards were acting as organs of the government where no other
governmental organs existed. See id. I 39-40, at 102-03, I 43-45, at 104-05. The

court found that "[u]nder international law Iran cannot, on the one hand, tolerate the
exercise of governmental authority by [the Revolutionary Guards] and at the same

time deny responsibility for wrongful acts committed by them." Id. 45, at 105.
380. 1974 Yearbook, supra note 62, art. 8(b), at 283.
381. See U.N. Articles, supra note 16, art. 9, at 3; see also U.N. Articles

Commentary, supra note 57, art. 9 cmt.

2, at 109-10 (discussing Yeager's standard

regarding liability under Article 9).
382. 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 122 (1983); see U.N. Articles Commentary, supra

note 57, art. 8 cmt.

5 n.169, at 107.

383. See U.N. Articles Commentary, supra note 57, art. 8 cmt. 5 n.169, at 107
(citing Starrett, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 143).
384. See Starrett,4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 143.
385. See id. at 154-56.
386. Loizidou v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2216; Loizidou v. Turkey
(Preliminary Objections), 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 7 (1995).
387. See Loizidou (preliminaryobjections), 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
62-63, at
23-24.
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three reasons.-

First, there was an immense Turkish military

presence in the region that secured the entire border of the TRNC.3 9
Second, this military controlled all lines of communication and
transportation.390 Third, all citizens in the TRNC were subject to
Turkish military courts.391 The standards iterated by the court for the
basis of its decision all focus on the acts or omissions of the Turkish
3 2
military, an organ of Turkey, and its effective control of the TRNC.
Loizidou, therefore, sheds little light on the issue of a State's
responsibility for the actions of de facto agents.
The failure of these cases to address the issue of effective control
with respect to de facto agents leaves only the standard found in
Military and ParamilitaryActivities as the guidepost for courts in

interpreting Article 8. Courts, therefore, must establish aspects of
specific command and effective control before attaching liability to
the State for the actions of its de facto agents.
3. Article 8 Precludes the Use of the Flexible Standard
The Commentary includes a discussion of the legitimacy of the
flexible standard set forth by the Appeals Chamber in Tadi6. 1 The
ILC states that "it is a matter for appreciation in each case whether
particular conduct was or was not carried out under the control of a
State, to such an extent that the conduct controlled should be
attributed to it. ' '39 The Commentary cites examples of cases where
courts made some determination about the level of control that was
necessary to attach liability to the State.395 None of these cases
388. Loizidou, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2216, T 16-17, at 2223, 56, at 2235-36.
389. Id. 56, at 2235-36.
390. Id. 16, at 2223.
391. Id. 17, at 2223; see also Press Release, Registrar of the European Court of
Human Rights, Judgement in the Case of Loizidou v. Turkey (Dec. 18, 1996),
available at http'//www.hr-action.org/chr/loizidou.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2002).
392. Loizidou, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. T 52, at 2234-35. Though the words
"effective control" appear in the decision, the analysis of liability focused on the
immense presence and actual control exercised by the Turkish military in the TRNC.
Id. 1 16-17, at 2223, 56, at 2235-36. The court also notes the international rejection
of the TRNC as a State, emphasizing the fact that the TRNC was merely a puppet
regime established by the Turkish Government. See id. 17 19-23, at 2223-25, 50, at
2233.
393. U.N. Articles Commentary, supra note 57, art. 8 cmt. 1 5, at 106-07; see Tadid
II (majority opinion), supra note 133, T 117, at 47-48, 137, at 58-59. Although the
Appeals Chamber in Tadi6 I rejected the IC's standard of effective control, the ILC
makes the point of rejecting the ICTY's disapproval of the standard from Military and
ParamilitaryActivities. See U.N. Articles Commentary, supra note 57, art. 8 cmt. q 5,
at 106-07. The Commentary states that the Appeals Chamber did not need to
"disapprove" of the ICJ's decision because the Appeals Chamber was dealing with
the issue of individual responsibility, while the ICJ was concerned with state
responsibility. Id.
394. U.N. Articles Commentary, supra note 57, art. 8 cmt. 5. at 107.
395. See id. %5 n.169, at 107.
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advocate for the use of a flexible standard; however, two of these
cases were used by the Appeals Chamber to support its creation of the
flexible standard.396 The Appeals Chamber's use of these cases as
support for its theory, therefore, is questionable.
The Appeals Chamber cites to Stephens, Yeager, and Loizidou as
grounds for establishing the looser standard for control with respect to
organized groups of individuals.3 97 These cases, however, do not
support the creation of a new standard for control under Article 8.
Stephens discusses liability under Article 9, considering Mexico's
responsibility for de facto governments and military organizations that
sprung up in regions where the official government was nonexistent. 398 The unofficial groups were authorized under an act of the
State to perform these governmental functions. 399 Therefore, this case
does not advocate a different standard for control under Article 8, but
rather lays out liability under Article 9 for unofficial governmental
organizations acting where there is a lack of official government
bodies.'
Yeager also establishes liability under the Article 9
standard." 1 Loizidou does not even consider liability for de facto
agents, but merely construes the immense presence the Turkish
military, in Cyprus and the illusory nature of the TRNC government,
as establishing Turkey's control over Northern Cyprus.4D2 These cases
do not support the Appeals Chamber's decision to overturn the
standard in Military and ParamilitaryActivities; rather, they support
standards under alternative Articles in the Articles on State
Responsibility.
In addition to the lack of support in the precedent for the flexible
standard, the standard created by the Appeals Chamber is illogical
and unworkable. The Appeals Chamber's standard creates tiers of
liability based on the composition of a group. If the group is
unorganized, then the State must have effective control over it to
attach liability to the State. If the group is hierarchically organized,
then a finding of general control is sufficient. What this means,
however, is that if a State was funding, arming, planning the
operations of, and encouraging the actions of an unorganized group,
the State could not be held responsible for the group's actions.
396. See Tadi6 II (majority opinion), supra note 133, 1$ 125-26, at 51-52, 128, at
54.
397. See id.
398. See U.N. Articles, supra note 16, art. 9, at 3; see also supra notes 78, 357-60 and
accompanying text.
399. See Stephens (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.I.A.A. 265, %$4-6, at 266-67 (Gen. Claims
Comm'n 1927).
400. See U.N. Articles, supra note 16, art. 9, at 3.
401. See Kenneth P. Yeager v. Iran, 17 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 92, %43, at 104
(1987); see supra notes 376-81 and accompanying text.
402. Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 9
62-63, at 23-24 (1995); see supra notes 386-92 and accompanying text.
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However, if the group then suddenly decided to organize itself and to
create a hierarchy, those same actions of the State would attach
liability to it. The State's actions have not changed, but in one
circumstance liability would attach, and in the other it would not.
This standard does not increase accountability, as the Appeals
Chamber claims. Rather, it would merely encourage a State to
suppress any evidence of the group's organization, or simply to work
with disorganized mobs or single individuals to escape liability for the
acts of the group. Therefore, the Appeals Chamber's standard is an
illogical ground for holding a State responsible, as it does not focus on
the State's activity to determine liability, but rather the structure of
the independent group.
Moreover, the Appeals Chamber's veritable reversal of Military and
Paramilitary Activities was unnecessary given the factual
circumstances of each case. The facts that the Appeals Chamber cited
in support of the conclusion that the VRS were de facto agents of the
JNA are the exact same facts that Judge McDonald cited to establish
that the JNA and VRS met the standard for effective control."' With
respect to command, the Appeals Chamber concentrated on the lack
of specific instructions from the JNA in connection with the specific
acts of the VRS; however, Judge McDonald indicated that there was
some evidence of specific commands coming from the FRY." With
respect to control, the factual situation in Yugoslavia, where the
separation of the JNA and VRS was little more than a change of
names, was significantly different from the situation in Nicaragua,
where the contras existed and were actively fighting against Nicaragua
prior to and after the United States' involvement. The JNA had
effective control over the VRS because they were the same entity.
Although the VRS had a separate name, it was merely a renamed
branch of the JNA sloughed off to appease the United Nations. All of
the VRS's directives came from the JNA or had been planned by the
JNA while the VRS was still a part of it. On the basis of these factual
differences, distinguishing Tadi6 from Military and Paramilitaty
Activities would have been the reasonable alternative, as opposed to
attempting to overrule the effective control standard.
Furthermore, the ILC does not agree with the Appeals Chamber
that the standard of control varies in each case.15 Although the ILC
admits that whether conduct is carried out under the control of the
State is a determination that will be fact intensive, the standard for
control that must be met in each case remains constant." The ILC
defines control as effective control, and agrees with the ICJ in Military
and ParamilitaryActivities that "a general situation of dependence
403. See supra text accompanying notes 261-62.
404. See Tadid I (McDonald, J., dissenting), supra note 183, 11 8-10.

405. See U.N. Articles Commentary, supra note 57, art. 8 cmt.
406. Id. art. 8 cmt. 1 4-5, at 105-07.

5, at 106-07.
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and support would be insufficient to justify attribution of the conduct
'4
to the State. '""
The ILC, therefore, rejects the flexible standard for
control stated in the Tadi6 opinion of the Appeals Chamber.
The ILC must also reject the standard set by Judge Brower in
Short.4 8 Judge Brower sought to attribute activity to Iran under a
flexible standard, like that of the Appeals Chamber,4 °9 only with
respect to the specificity of the command required for liability, as
opposed to the degree of control necessary.41
Although the
Commentary does not specifically address Judge Brower's standard,
because the Commentary rejects the flexible standard in Tadi IH, and
because these standards are so similar, the ILC must also reject the
standard advocated in Judge Brower's dissent in Short.
The rejection of this standard is supported by the legal principles
underlying the law of state responsibility. 41' The exception to the
general rule that a State is not responsible for the acts of private
individuals is meant to be a narrow one.412 The flexible standard,
however, allows a State to be held liable for a much wider variety of
private activity. Additionally, a flexible formulation for liability
would lead to confusion and inconsistency in the law.41 3 States would
have no notice of the actions for which they could be held responsible
until the events happened, assuming, as the flexible standard does,
that the standard changes with the circumstances. Courts would have
no hard standard to guide them in trying to sort out what activities
constitute a violation attributable to the State. Therefore, any flexible
407. Id. art. 8 cmt. 4, at 105-06.
408. See supra notes 235-37 and accompanying text.
409. The Appeals Chamber, however, does not seem to support Judge Brower's
standard. The Chamber cites the majority's opinion favorably as supporting a strict
standard for individual liability. See Tadi6 II (majority opinion), supra note 133, 135,
at 58. This suggests that the flexible standard in Tadi6 II is not so flexible, merely
providing gradations in the standard for control, as opposed to a free reign approach,
as Judge Brower supported.
410. See supra notes 235-37,292-94 and accompanying text.
411. See supra notes 19-36 and accompanying text.
412. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 16, at 188-89 (June 27) (Sep. Op. Ago, J.) (noting that only
in rare instances "does international law recognize, as a rare exception to the rule,

that the conduct of persons or groups which are neither agents nor organs of the
State, nor members of its apparatus even in the broadest acceptation of that term,
may be held to be acts of that State"); Cheng, supra note 33, at 208-10; Oppenheim,
supra note 25, at 549 (stating that the State's "responsibility for acts of private persons
is limited"). Cheng notes that "acts of private individuals are not acts of the
State .... In international law, States are not held responsible for acts committed by
them." Cheng, supra note 33, at 208.
413. See H. Lauterpacht, Codification and Development of InternationalLaw, 49

Am. J. Int'l L. 16, 19-23 (1955). Discussing the evils of uncertainty in international
law, Lauterpacht states that "[a]s a result [of a lack of codification], the uncertainties,

gaps, and obscurities of the law are not merely perpetuated. They feed and grow on
their own evil inasmuch as they are kept alive and magnified by the conflicting and
extreme assertions of the parties to disputes." Id. at 20; see also Spelliscy, supra note
133, at 145, 152-57.
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formulation that varies culpability with the factual circumstances is
not a valid method for establishing liability under the Articles on State
Responsibility.
The standard for when a State will be held responsible for an
individual's actions in conformity with a statement from a head of
State in light of the case law and Commentary to the Articles is
simple: there must be some aspects of both command and control
present to attach liability to the State. The command must refer
specifically to the activity in question, and must specify the means and
methods to be utilized in the operation." 4 The control must be such
that the individual would not have undertaken the action without the
involvement of the State.415
B. The Future of State Responsibility
The Articles on State Responsibility are clearly at odds with the
relevant precedent; therefore, there are two options for the future.
One option is for the ILC to bring the Articles into conformity with
the precedent by providing that elements of both command and
control must be evident before liability can be attached to the State.
Alternatively, the Articles on State Responsibility can be viewed by
courts as changing the precedent and expanding on the concept of
state responsibility for the actions of individuals.
The latter option is not very plausible. The Commentary itself
seems to emphasize that elements of both command and control are
required to find liability.416
Furthermore, the Commentary
emphasizes the narrow nature of the Article 8 exception to the
general rule that the conduct of private individuals "isnot attributable
'
to the State."417
However, changes in the Articles on State Responsibility from their
original draft form to their form as adopted suggest that perhaps the
ILC sought to allow for greater state responsibility under the Articles
as adopted.418 Additionally, there is greater interest internationally in
holding States responsible for their conduct with respect to private
individuals, as evinced by recent General Assembly resolutions
regarding terrorism.4" 9
414. See supra text accompanying notes 143-49.
415. See supra notes 191-203 and accompanying text.
416. See supra Part III.A.2.
417. U.N. Articles Commentary, supra note 57, art. 8 cmt. 1 1, at 103.
41& See supra text accompanying notes 42-51 (discussing how the ILC is charged
with development, as well as the codification of international law).
419. See G.A. Res. 1, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., 1st plen. mtg. 1 4, U.N. Doc.
AJRES/56/1 (2001); G.A. Res. 110, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 76th plen. mtg., U.N.
Doc. AIRES/54/110 (2000); Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International
Terrorism, G.A. Res. 60, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., 84th plen. mtg., Annex II 5(a),
U.N. Doc. AIRES/49/60 (1994).
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The ball is now in the ILC's court to take some action with respect
to the Articles on State Responsibility. If the standard is to remain
that of command and effective control, the ILC must revise the
Commentary to Article 8 to reflect that standard. hE If the ILC meant
to expand on the standard of liability under the precedent, 2 ' the
Commission must do more than simply change some language. The
ILC must thoroughly explain the standard it is establishing and update
the case references that the Commentary makes in support of the
standard. As the cases currently cited in the Commentary emphasize
the requirement of both command and control, if these factors are to
be disjunctive, the precedent must either be ignored or explained in
more than a footnote.
The Articles in their present state, however, support the conclusion
that the ILC did not intend to expand upon the liability set forth in
the precedent. Therefore, any analysis of a State's responsibility for
an individual's actions in conformity with a statement from a head of
state must entail both an analysis of command and control. The next
part utilizes this standard to answer the query originally put forth:
whether the United States would be liable for the actions of an
individual who acts in conformity with President Bush's demand for
Osama bin Laden, dead or alive.
IV. THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE ACTIONS
OF INDIVIDUALS IN CONFORMITY WITH PRESIDENT BUSH'S
STATEMENT THAT HE WANTS OSAMA BIN LADEN, DEAD OR ALIVE

Assume that the individual mentioned in the Introduction actually
did murder an entire village in response to President Bush's statement
that he wanted Osama bin Laden, dead or alive.422 Applying the
standard set out in Part III, should the United States be held
responsible for his actions? The specificity of President Bush's
statement as a command must be considered in light of the control the
United States exercised over this individual.
President Bush's statement could attach liability to the United
States for several reasons. First, the actions of the individual would be
a violation of international law, which is the first factor required to
analyze whether the State can be held responsible under the Articles
on State Responsibility.4' Second, President Bush's statement is
420. The paragraph of the Commentary that must be revised is paragraph 7 of the
Commentary to Article 8, which states that "the three terms 'instructions', 'direction'
and 'control' are disjunctive; it is sufficient to establish any one of them." U.N.
Articles Commentary, supra note 57, art. 8 cmt. T 7, at 108.
421. As the ILC is charged to both develop and codify international law, it is
perfectly legitimate for the Articles on State Responsibility to disagree with and
expand upon the precedent from the courts. See supra Part I.B.
422. See supra text accompanying notes 10-14.
423. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
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specific as to a target-Osama bin Laden. This is certainly more
specific than the Ayatollah's general statement that the students
should "expand with all their might their attacks against the United
States and Israel. 4 24 Third, the United States has promoted taking
measures to find and secure bin Laden's presence by establishing a
substantial reward for his capture and advertising that reward via
multiple media, including dropping pamphlets over Afghanistan.4z
Under the standard of command and effective control, however,
President Bush's statement should not attach liability to the United
States. Following the principles established in Diplomatic and
Consular Staff, to attach liability, President Bush's statement would
have had to contain specific instructions regarding the means and
methods to be used in capturing Osama bin Laden. '26 The statement
itself was general; it failed to give explicit instructions regarding the
means to be used or other actions to be taken by an individual. In
addition, the administration pulled away from Bush's initial, rather
heavy-handed "dead or alive" statement, endorsing only information
as to bin Laden's whereabouts and expressly stating that the reward is
not for bounty hunters. 427 This retraction of the original "dead or
alive" mandate is what is now on the web page advertising the reward
money,4' and, therefore, the administration has taken as many steps
as possible to quell whatever incitement was contained in Bush's
original off-the-cuff response.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that the United States controls
individuals acting in conformity with the statement. Unlike the
situation in Military and ParamilitaryActivities,4 -9 the United States
has not sent troops to Afghanistan to train civilians in guerilla tactics
to be used in capturing bin Laden, nor has any money or equipment
been approved for use by individuals looking specifically for bin
Laden. Most importantly, Bush's command itself was not specific
enough so that it alone would tend to show control. In Military and
ParamilitaryActivities, it was held that mere statements regarding
tactics in general were not enough to attach liability.4 To attach
liability, it would have to be shown that the individual in question
would not be using such threats and tactics in his search for bin Laden
without Bush's statement.43' Considering the general nature of Bush's

424. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980
I.C.J. 3, 59, at 29-30 (May 24).
425. See supra text accompanying notes 8-11.
426. See supra text accompanying notes 143-49.
427. Reward for Bin Laden's Arrest, supra note 7.
428. U.S. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Most Wanted Terrorists: Usama Bin Laden,
at http://www.fbi.gov/mostvant/terroristslterubi.htm (last visited Mar. 24,2002).
429. (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14 (June 27).
430. See supra notes 331-45 and accompanying text.
431. See supra notes 191-203 and accompanying text.
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statement and a lack of others"circumstances evincing control,
attaching liability under this standard is unlikely.
Therefore, the United States has little to worry about in terms of
being held responsible for President Bush's statement expressing a
desire for bin Laden's capture, dead or alive. Although any actions
similar to those threatened by the individual quoted in the
Introduction would be tragic, a State would be hard pressed to hold
the United States responsible for those actions. Recourse would only
be available against the individual for his actions.
CONCLUSION

The Articles on State Responsibility codify the body of
international law concerned with those actions for which a State can
be held responsible. This Note expands on one of the many topics
covered by the Articles, that of a State's responsibility for a private
person who acts on behalf of the State in accordance with a statement
from that State.
A careful examination of the case law reveals that there are two
standards under which a State can be held liable for a statement:
strict command and control, and a flexible standard. The Articles on
State Responsibility reject the flexible standard, following the
precedent that a State's responsibility for the actions of individuals
must be narrowly tailored. The Articles adopt the first standard,
providing for a State's responsibility where the State commands or
controls the individual. The ILC's disjunctive standard, however,
does not follow the precedent, which required both aspects of
command and control to attach liability to the State. Furthermore,
the Commentary to Article 8 does not support the disjunctive
standard that it advocates.
To resolve this discrepancy, the ILC will either have to amend
Article 8 to require both command and control to attach liability or
rewrite the Commentary to explain and clarify this development of
the law. Until the ILC takes such measures, courts should look to the
strict standard set in cases like Military and ParamilitaryActivities,
which requires both command and control before attaching liability to
the State for the actions of individuals in accordance with a statement
from a head of state.

